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EDITING NATURE: RECONCEPTUALIZING 
BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE 
JONAS J. MONAST* 
Abstract: CRISPR-Cas9 (CRISPR) and other advances in gene editing tech-
niques are fostering a rapid evolution within the field of biotechnology. Scien-
tists can now modify the DNA of living organisms with precision by remov-
ing undesirable traits or inserting desirable traits. The edits may impact a sin-
gle organism or result in genetic alterations that are designed to pass on to off-
spring (referred to as “gene drives”), potentially altering or eradicating an en-
tire species. Prior to the discovery of the CRISPR gene editing process, the 
state of the technology presented barriers to widespread and precise genetic 
engineering. CRISPR changes the equation. With fewer technological limits 
and the technical and economic accessibility of new gene editing techniques, 
society now must grapple with fundamental questions regarding the proper 
use of technologies that can reengineer organisms, species, and ecosystems. 
The existing approach to biotechnology governance is unprepared to address 
these new capabilities, in part because the technology has quickly surpassed 
the bounds once thought possible, and in part because the regulatory system is 
premised on a narrow set of considerations designed to foster advances in the 
field of biotechnology. This Article examines early regulatory oversight of ad-
vanced gene editing techniques and identifies important gaps in legal over-
sight of genetic engineering: a failure of existing laws to cover some CRISPR-
edited organisms; narrow consideration of ecological impacts; regulators’ ina-
bility to consider alternatives; and a failure to assess and respond to compet-
ing ideologies. This Article then argues for addressing those gaps by incorpo-
rating a natural resource management perspective into biotechnology govern-
ance. The article concludes by arguing that biotechnology governance should 
incorporate a natural resource management perspective. The scientific ad-
vances are new, but the challenges with balancing competing considerations 
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regarding the use and alteration of natural resources are not. Although existing 
natural resource laws do not contemplate the ability to reorder ecosystems via 
gene editing, there is an established regulatory system designed to address 
risks of extinction, accommodate competing ideologies regarding resource 
use, and incorporate interests of future generations when considering irre-
versible decisions regarding natural resources—issues that are all implicated 
by gene editing. 
[W]ith the newest and arguably most effective genetic engineering tool, 
CRISPR-Cas9 (CRISPR for short), the genome—an organism’s entire 
DNA content, including all its genes—has become almost as editable as 
a simple piece of text. As long as the genetic code for a particular trait 
is known, scientists can use CRISPR to insert, edit, or delete the associ-
ated gene in virtually any living plant’s or animal’s genome.1 
Genetics has provided a paradigm for an entire new vision of human po-
tential, and the potential of nature.2 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2016, Florida residents faced warnings over the Zika 
virus, which is transmitted by mosquito bites and tied to birth defects such 
as microcephaly.3 Pregnant women were advised to stay indoors, wear long 
sleeves and pants, apply bug spray, and sleep under bed nets to avoid Flori-
da’s ubiquitous mosquitoes.4 To address this public health crisis, the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a field test of genet-
ically-modified mosquitoes to control the risk of Zika virus and dengue fe-
ver. If successful, the offspring of the modified mosquitoes would die be-
fore they could reproduce. To make the judgment about the mosquitoes, the 
FDA turned to existing biotechnology rules—a body of law that is not pre-
pared for the latest developments in gene editing technologies.5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 JENNIFER A. DOUDNA & SAMUEL H. STERNBERG, A CRACK IN CREATION: GENE EDITING 
AND THE UNTHINKABLE POWER TO CONTROL EVOLUTION, at xiii (2017). 
 2 WORKING GRP. OF THE SOC’Y, RELIGION & TECH. PROJECT, ENGINEERING GENESIS: THE 
ETHICS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING IN NON-HUMAN SPECIES 258 (Donald Bruce & Ann Bruce 
eds., 2013) (1998). 
 3 Sammy Mack, Pregnant Women in Miami Take Extra Precautions Against Zika, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/17/490314048/pregnant-women-in-miami-take-
extra-precautions-against-zika [https://perma.cc/W4VN-3XVQ]; Questions About Zika, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/zika/about/questions.html [http://perma.cc/
JG2F-CXR4]. 
 4 Mack, supra note 3. 
 5 See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (FONSI) IN 
SUPPORT OF A PROPOSED FIELD TRIAL OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MALE AEDES AEGYPTI 
MOSQUITOES OF THE LINE OX513A IN KEY HAVEN, MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA UNDER AN 
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The field trial was the first FDA-approved release of a genetically-
modified insect and is an early example of a federal agency grappling with 
an emerging body of gene editing techniques and the modified organisms 
the techniques can produce.6 The pace of these biotechnology advances is 
increasing dramatically thanks to a groundbreaking new development in 
gene editing known as “clustered, regularly interspaced, short palindromic 
repeats,” or CRISPR-Cas 9 (“CRISPR”).7 CRISPR and other advances in 
genetic engineering give public and private actors the ability to edit the 
DNA of living organisms, including human beings, with precision.8 Scien-
tists may deploy CRISPR to remove undesirable traits or insert desirable 
traits. The edits may impact a single organism or result in genetic alterations 
designed to pass on to offspring (referred to as “gene drives”), potentially 
impacting an entire species.9 
Public policy is only beginning to consider the broad implications of 
this new generation of genomic sciences.10 Governance of CRISPR and 
other gene editing techniques relies on various existing laws which are de-
signed to address previous methods of genetic engineering.11 Safety and 
risk management are the dominant lenses through which regulators United 
States view questions regarding biotechnology research and commercializa-
tion—an approach that is incapable of addressing the fundamental ethical 
and moral issues raised by recent advances in gene editing technologies.12 
                                                                                                                           
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW ANIMAL DRUG EXEMPTION (Aug. 5, 2016) (relying in part on the Coor-
dinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology to make its determination). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Paul Enriquez, CRISPR GMOs, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 432, 509−10 (2017). CRISPR tech-
nology varies from past methods of genetic engineering technology due to its ability to exactly 
target a specific DNA site by using the Cas9 protein which allows scientists to either delete or 
insert certain DNA at the targeted site. Id. The mosquitoes involved in the proposed Key Haven 
field trial were modified using a different method of genetic engineering. See FOOD & DRUG AD-
MIN., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF AEDES AEGYPTI OX513A, 
at 16, 18, 21 (Aug. 5, 2016) [hereinafter FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT] (noting 
that Oxitec’s mosquitoes include a “recombinant DNA (rDNA) construct”). 
 8 DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 9 Gregory E. Kaebnick et al., Precaution and Governance of Emerging Technologies: Pre-
caution Can Be Consistent with Support of Science, 354 SCIENCE 710, 711 (2016). 
 10 See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Gene-Edited Cows, Rogue Clinics, Speedier Drug Approvals: The 
Challenges Facing Trump’s FDA Chief, 541 NATURE 146, 146–47 (2017) (identifying regulatory 
questions facing the Trump administration); Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s (r)evolution: 
Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J. L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 8–9 
(discussing early policy responses to biotechnology developments). 
 11 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The Living Regulatory Challenges of 
Synthetic Biology, 100 IOWA L. REV. 155, 173 (2014) (noting that synthetic biology will be sub-
ject to “existing environmental and human health protection statutes”). 
 12 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING 
SCIENCE, NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUBLIC VALUES 63–70 
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Policymakers’ responses to the rapidly advancing field of gene editing tech-
nologies has the potential to fundamentally alter humans’ relationship with 
the natural world.13 
Early regulatory decisions regarding CRISPR and other advanced gene 
editing techniques reveal important gaps in legal oversight of genetic engi-
neering. Some of these gaps—such as the limited consideration of ecologi-
cal impacts, the lack of authority to compare gene editing with alternate 
approaches to achieve similar benefits, and the failure to address competing 
ideologies—existed prior to the advent of CRISPR but are exacerbated by 
the new techniques. Other gaps—primarily instances of gene-edited prod-
ucts escaping regulatory oversight altogether—raise important new ques-
tions for the role of public policy in shaping the evolution of emerging ge-
nomic sciences.14 
This Article argues that gene editing should be viewed in the context of 
resource management.15 Although CRISPR is new, many of the conflicts 
presented by the technology are not. Over the past century-and-a-half, a 
broad body of law has evolved to address conflicts regarding ownership of 
natural resources, acceptable uses for specific types of resources, environ-
mental impacts of resource and ecosystem alterations, and the balance be-
tween resource use, conservation, and preservation. The nation’s multifacet-
ed approach to natural resource management reaches different conclusions 
regarding alteration, preservation, and use of specific resources, but collec-
tively natural resource governance grapples with fundamental questions 
regarding humans’ relationship with natural systems. To varying degrees, 
natural resource statutes require agencies to consider ecological impacts, 
economic interests, risk management, interests of future generations, and 
                                                                                                                           
(2016) [hereinafter GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON]. The genetic engineering debate is not, and 
never has been, solely about concerns regarding safety and risk. Genetic engineering is controver-
sial because it challenges existing norms about the proper use of technology and it raises vexing 
ethical and ecological concerns about safety, risk, irreversibility, and the disparity between those 
who may benefit and those who may be harmed. Id.; Kaebnick et al., supra note 9, at 711.  
 13 See, e.g., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING: AN ETHICAL REVIEW—A 
SHORT GUIDE 4 (2016), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-editing-an-ethical-
review-short-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7DP-RT9T] (“[G]enome editing could transform not 
only the field of biology, but the range of expectations and ambitions about human control over 
the biological world.”). 
 14 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 67–70 (2017) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIO-
TECHNOLOGY]. 
 15 See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text. This is not to argue that a natural resource 
perspective should supplant other applicable bodies of law. Laws regarding public health, intellec-
tual property, and protection of agricultural products all remain critical pieces of the biotechnolo-
gy governance system. The central claim in this Article is that these existing laws leave out im-
portant considerations that are commonly addressed in the natural resources context. 
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evolving societal values.16 Altering species and ecosystems via CRISPR 
raises the same suite of issues, yet there is little overlap between biotech-
nology governance and the broad body of natural resources law.17 
Not only does the disconnect between biotechnology and natural re-
source governance create direct conflicts between policy goals, it also fails 
to incorporate the values-based considerations that underlie many of the 
natural resource statutes.18 Natural resource management offers models for 
addressing the key regulatory gaps presented by gene editing techniques, as 
well as models for incorporating a broader set of considerations into the 
biotechnology governance framework.19 A failure to incorporate this broad-
er set of considerations leaves biotechnology governance unprepared to face 
the moral, legal, and ecological questions regarding proper use of a tech-
nology that can fundamentally alter living organisms and, by extension, 
ecosystems and economies. The paper focuses primarily on the governance 
of non-human applications, but draws lessons from the more restrictive, 
values-based regulatory standards applied to questions of human genome 
editing. 
Although this Article calls for a conceptual shift toward a natural re-
source perspective, it does not advocate for a particular normative resolu-
tion of gene editing conflicts. Natural resource management is as much 
about balancing competing interests as it is about prioritizing a particular 
outcome (e.g., managing for conservation or preservation). Instead, the Ar-
ticle offers a new conceptual model for understanding gene editing’s place 
within the values-based governance framework that already considers vex-
ing topics such as irreversible changes to living organisms and ecosystems, 
interests of future generations, and conflicting viewpoints regarding re-
source extraction and preservation. 
Part I of this Article introduces CRISPR and identifies governance 
challenges presented by new gene editing techniques.20 Part II provides an 
overview of the existing approach to biotechnology governance in the Unit-
ed States.21 Part III explores early examples of federal agencies applying 
this approach to organisms that are modified via gene editing techniques 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 47–99 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 100–108 and accompanying text. 
 18 See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 69 
box 3-1 (stating that “[v]alues are always embedded in risk analysis by the choices and interpreta-
tions of the people conducting them and the selection of risk-assessment endpoints of concern, 
methods, and questions”). 
 19 See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 25–46 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 47–99 and accompanying text. 
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and identifies critical gaps in the regulatory system.22 The focus on whether 
a product is altered in a manner that poses a risk to human health, plant and 
animal health, or ecosystems fails to address a broader range of ethical con-
cerns and societal values that arise in the gene editing context. A prospec-
tive use may be deemed safe, yet it could still raise issues that extend be-
yond the realm of risk management or scientific expertise. 
Part IV turns to natural resource law as a model for expanding the de-
bate beyond a case by case risk management approach to an approach that 
addresses competing values regarding the use of gene editing and the ecolog-
ical impacts of doing so.23 It concludes by identifying strategies to incorpo-
rate a natural resource management approach into the current risk-based regu-
latory framework.24 Together, these strategies offer an approach for balancing 
conflicting views of gene editing and establishing the equivalent of protected 
spaces in the genetic engineering context—circumstances where gene editing 
is prohibited or limited on a temporary or permanent basis. 
I. NEW CHALLENGES FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE 
CRISPR opens the door to a vast array of genetic alterations, allowing 
scientists to alter humans, plants, animals, and other living organisms by 
removing undesirable traits or inserting desirable ones.25 These edits may 
apply to individual organisms through non-heritable edits.26 The precision 
of CRISPR also significantly expands the ability to permanently alter or 
eradicate entire species though gene drives—edits to the germline (repro-
ductive) cells that produce heritable traits.27 Although only a handful of 
gene-edited organisms have been approved for release in the United States 
and the European Union, numerous releases are likely to occur in the near 
future.28 CRISPR, therefore, presents one of many tests for the Anthropo-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 100–224 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 225–304 and accompanying text. 
 25 See generally Jennifer A. Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New Frontier of Ge-
nome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1077 (2014); News Release, Nat’l Insts. of 
Heath, Researchers Identify Potential Alternative to CRISPR-Cas Genome Editing Tools, (Oct. 
22, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/researchers-identify-potential-alternative-
crispr-cas-genome-editing-tools [https://perma.cc/C5AA-S4ZM]. 
 26 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, 
AND GOVERNANCE 3 (2017) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME EDITING]. 
 27 GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 156–57. 
 28 See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 41, 
172 (explaining the scope of new biotechnology products not currently under U.S. regulatory 
power including, “[p]lants that glow, yogurts that harbor biosensors, pigs that develop twice as 
much muscle, and microbial communities that may protect honey bees from parasitic mites”). 
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cene, in which technological advancements allow humans to fundamentally, 
and permanently, reshape and dominate natural systems.29 
The new generation of gene editing techniques presents a complex mix 
of prospective benefits and complex ethical questions. Gene editing is both 
a miraculous scientific breakthrough with the potential to save or improve 
human and nonhuman lives and a pathway for creating designer babies and 
pets.30 These techniques simultaneously offer a tool to permanently alter 
ecosystems by enhancing some species and driving others to extinction and 
create an emerging threat on the scale of weapons of mass destruction that 
humanity is not prepared to contain.31 Casting the technology in the context 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 3, 6 (2017) (noting the 
Anthropocene Epoch is a proposed new “geological timeframe” denoted by the impact humans 
have had on Earth); R. Alta Charo & Henry T. Greely, CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks, 15 
AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 11, 15 (2015) (describing the Anthropocene Epoch as a proposed geologic 
division characterized by human modification of living things in the world). 
 30 Antonio Regalado, First Gene-Edited Dogs Reported in China, MIT TECH. R. (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542616/first-gene-edited-dogs-reported-in-china/ [https://perma.
cc/P8FA-3Y4S] [hereinafter Regalado, First Gene Edited Dogs Reported in China]; Antonio Re-
galado, Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT TECH. R. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.technology
review.com/s/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby/ [https://perma.cc/J4UG-G7A7]; see Hong Ma 
et al., Correction of a Pathogenic Gene Mutation in Human Embryos, 548 NATURE 413, 413 
(2017) (reporting on the first successful use of gene editing to repair a disease-causing genetic 
mutation); Gina Kolata, Gene Editing Spurs Hope for Transplanting Pig Organs into Humans, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/health/gene-editing-pigs-
organ-transplants.html [https://perma.cc/L3QF-DPVV] (noting the potential to use gene-editing to 
facilitate transplanting pig organs into humans).  
 31 It is not uncommon for articles in scientific journals and popular press books, websites, and 
magazines to describe gene editing and genetic engineering as controlling or altering evolution or 
facilitating intentional extinction. See, e.g., DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 1, at xiii (describ-
ing capabilities of genomic editing technology); Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed 
Servs. Comm., Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, James R. Clap-
per (Feb. 9, 2016) (stating that “research in genome editing conducted by countries with different 
regulatory or ethical standards than those of Western countries probably increases the risk of the 
creation of potentially harmful biological agents or products”); see also Juan Enriquez & Steve 
Gullans, With Gene Therapy We Could Direct Our Own Evolution, DISCOVER (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/03/09/gene-therapy-direct-evolution/ [https://perma.
cc/9ZZD-UUKX] (noting the potential for gene editing to allow selective evolution by choosing 
“desirable traits” and rejecting “negative traits”); Jens Hegg, Is Intentional Extinction Ever the 
Right Thing?, PLOS ECOLOGY COMMUNITY (July 1, 2016), http://blogs.plos.org/ecology/2016/
07/01/is-intentional-extinction-ever-the-right-thing/ [https://perma.cc/EG2J-SD38] (considering 
the balance between extinction of one species for the benefit of another); Sean Illing, Genetically-
Engineered Humans Will Arrive Sooner Than You Think. And We’re Not Ready, VOX (Aug. 3, 
2017), https://www.vox.com/conversations/2016/10/24/13357298/michael-bess-biotechnology-bio
engineering-technology-revolution-science [https://perma.cc/7ZRH-WH5T] (interviewing histori-
an Michael Bess about the implications of genetically-engineered humans); Antonio Regalado, 
The Extinction Invention, MIT TECH. R. (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
601213/the-extinction-invention/ [https://perma.cc/P48C-HJKN] (identifying potential concerns 
associated with using gene drive to eliminate certain mosquito populations). 
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of designer babies, evolution and extinction, and global threats highlights 
the importance of updating the biotechnology regulatory framework to 
grapple with the critical value choices inherent in determining how to effec-
tively govern this new form of genetic engineering with such broad applica-
tions and potentially profound and irreversible impacts. In the absence of 
technological restraints, effective regulatory standards will be critical to 
inform professional standards, ethics, and public policy guiding when pro-
fessional and amateur scientists may alter individual organisms or entire 
ecosystems using precision gene editing procedures.32 
Gene editing differs from previous genetic engineering techniques in 
significant respects. Unlike previous techniques, CRISPR can achieve ge-
netic alterations by deleting a portion of an organism’s existing DNA with-
out inserting foreign DNA into the organism.33 This distinction may allow 
CRISPR-edited organisms to avoid regulatory triggers that apply to organ-
isms modified via earlier genetic engineering techniques.34 CRISPR allows 
more precise  genetic alterations than previous techniques, potentially miti-
gating concerns about unintended genetic changes resulting from the use of 
CRISPR. Perhaps the most important difference is CRISPR’s relative sim-
plicity and low cost. These factors have allowed the technique to spread 
quickly to laboratories across the globe, complicating governance efforts 
due to the large number of actors and international scope.35 
For example, scientists are altering fruits and vegetables to increase 
shelf life in grocery stores. Work is underway to edit crops’ drought toler-
ance and pest resistance to increase agricultural production.36 Companies 
are experimenting with gene drive techniques to eradicate disease-carrying 
insects and insects that harm agricultural crops.37 Laboratories in China and 
                                                                                                                           
 32 The existence of conflicting views within the scientific community regarding human 
germline editing highlights the need for norms to guide both research and commercialization. 
Debates over proper types of research and commercial applications occur primarily within aca-
demic journals, often focusing on a single discipline. All the while, research and plans for com-
mercialization continue. 
 33 Enriquez, supra note 7, at 509–10. 
 34 Id. at 512–13. 
 35 See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 41 
(noting the large number of actors and products resulting from developments in biotechnology); 
Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 25, at 1077 (observing that many laboratories “around the 
world” are using new biotechnology to develop new applications). This paper does not tackle 
questions regarding international governance of CRISPR. 
 36 GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 4; PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PROD-
UCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 45–46. 
 37 GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 4, 26; PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 
PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 48–49. 
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the United States have utilized CRISPR to edit human embryos.38 Other 
applications under development include hornless cows, customized dogs, 
and a reintroduced prehistoric wooly mammoth.39 The list could go on. The 
genetically-engineered cat is out of the bag. 
This is a critical time for reconsidering biotechnology governance. The 
current system of biotechnology governance in the United States is primari-
ly designed to address risks to human health and agricultural products. 
Laws governing drugs and medical procedures for humans are generally far 
more restrictive than laws overseeing plant and animal products, particular-
ly when those products are not intended for human consumption.40 In in-
                                                                                                                           
 38 HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 41; Steve Connor, First Human Embryos 
Edited in U.S., MIT TECH R. (July 26, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608350/first-
human-embryos-edited-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/8ATA-EHQE]. 
 39 See Amy Maxmen, Gene-Edited Animals Face US Regulatory Crackdown, NATURE (Jan. 19, 
2017), http://www.nature.com/news/gene-edited-animals-face-us-regulatory-crackdown-1.21331 
[https://perma.cc/B3ZT-5CYW] (describing the creation of hornless dairy cattle “by inserting a gene 
from naturally hornless beef cattle into a breed of the same species that is used in milk production”); 
Regalado, First Gene Edited Dogs Reported in China, supra note 30 (reporting on the first gene-edited 
dogs); Simon Worrall, We Could Resurrect the Woolly Mammoth. Here’s How., NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(July 9, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/07/woolly-mammoths-extinction-cloning-
genetics/ [https://perma.cc/3A5K-Y98R] (describing the project to use genetic editing to create a 
wooly mammoth).  
 40 See generally Enriquez, supra note 7, at 499–500 (noting the limitation of the 2017 Update 
to Coordinated Framework that, “products posing little to no risk [to human health] ought not to 
be subject to onerous regulation”); Jennifer Kuzma & Lindsey Rawls, Engineering the Wild: Gene 
Drives and Intergenerational Equity, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 279, 293–94 (2016) (noting that the fu-
ture consequences of gene drives are unknown and, therefore, could pose risks to future popula-
tions); Alison Peck, Re-Framing Biotechnology Regulation, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 314, 317–23 
(2017) (noting that new genetic engineering technology has surpassed the scope of the 2017 Up-
date to Coordinated Framework’s regulation). These articles complement a robust body of legal 
scholarship regarding governance of biotechnology and genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) 
generally. See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology 
Model for Regulating the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 93, 156–65 (2007) (proposing an evolutionary biology model for regulating 
GMOs); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International 
Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583 (2007) 
(examining the risks and benefits of GMOs for developing countries). Much of the CRISPR-
focused legal scholarship that has been published to date focuses on patent and copyright issues. 
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 COR-
NELL L. REV. 271, 278 (2017) (describing the dispute over patent rights for CRISPR); Deborah 
Ku, The Patentability of the CRISPR-Cas9 Genome Editing Tool, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
408, 422–39 (2017) (discussing whether CRISPR technology is a patent-eligible subject matter); 
Robin Feldman, The Crispr Revolution: What Editing Human DNA Reveals About the Patent 
System’s DNA, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 392, 404–10 (2016), https://www.uclalawreview.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Feldman-D64-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/F82V-4TXT] (dis-
cussing the tension between the slow-moving U.S. patent system and the rapid innovation of 
CRISPR technology); Kristin Beale, Recent Development, The Crispr Patent Battle: Who Will Be 
“Cut” Out of Patent Rights to One of the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of Our Generation?, 
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM, Feb. 9, 2016, at 4–6, http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/
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stances not involving direct human applications, biotechnology governance 
is premised on the notion that genetically-engineered products are not in-
herently dangerous and do not require separate regulatory approaches.41 
Although biotechnology has long faced opposition, the costs, technical 
limits, and barriers to entry associated with earlier genetic engineering tech-
niques allowed decisionmakers to avoid grappling with many of the difficult 
decisions regarding appropriate and prohibited uses.42 The range of potential 
uses of gene editing, the likely exponential increase in the number of edited 
organisms in the near future, and the increasing speed of further technological 
innovations will challenge the existing regulatory framework.43 
Rapid advances in the field of gene editing are now forcing the unre-
solved issues, and in the process raising complex moral, ethical, and ecolog-
ical questions.44 For example, the same process for eradicating disease-
carrying insects could also apply to insects that are considered nuisances to 
humans or animals but are not disease vectors. Should regulatory approach-
es differ depending on the type of gene editing applications, such as distinc-
tions between those that address critical societal needs and those that allow 
discretionary alterations for mere convenience, comfort, cost reduction, or 
aesthetic preferences?45 Furthermore, how will gene editing to eradicate 
                                                                                                                           
2016/02/KBeale-CRISPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/R64A-TBML] (describing patent issues surround-
ing CRISPR). 
 41 See generally Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products: Final Version 
of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, Exec. Office 
of the President (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework] (summarizing 
that governance decisions do not turn on the fact that scientists engineered the change, or the poten-
tial evolutionary impacts of the genetic changes). 
 42 See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 64 (stating that “[g]enetic engineer-
ing sparked ethical debate as soon as it was imagined”). 
 43 PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 27 (noting 
that “[i]ncreasing investment in the bioeconomy, complex societal challenges, the confluence of 
new technical drivers, and a proliferation of new actors are transforming both biotechnology prod-
ucts and the context in which the U.S. regulatory system operates”). Another recent National 
Academy report predicts calls for rapid release of gene-edited organisms to address, “crisis situations, 
before there is adequate knowledge of their ecological effects, and before mitigation plans for unin-
tended consequences are in place.” GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 1; see Jay 
Bennett, 11 Crazy Gene-Hacking Things We Can Do with CRISPR, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 26, 
2016), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/a19067/11-crazy-things-we-can-do-with-crispr-
cas9/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WH-SBBU] (listing potential uses for CRISPR); Kristopher Grunert, 
Backyard Gene Editing Risks Creating a Monster, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.
newscientist.com/article/mg23331173-400-backyard-gene-editing-risks-creating-a-monster/ [https://
perma.cc/9AYS-4VJ7] (noting the risks of unregulated use of CRISPR). 
 44 PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 27; 
Grunert, supra note 43; see GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that 
“[g]enetic engineering sparked ethical debate as soon as it was imagined”). 
 45 See Bruce L. Webber et al., Opinion: Is CRISPR-Based Gene Drive a Biocontrol Silver 
Bullet or Global Conservation Threat?, 112 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 10,565, 
 
2388 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2377 
species interact with statutes regarding conservation and species preserva-
tion? Should public policy restrict gene editing if other conventional tech-
niques are available to achieve the same result? Should policymakers con-
sider new regulatory measures that account for a broader array of societal 
values implicated by gene editing techniques? Perhaps most fundamentally, 
who makes these decisions and to what degree do they need to engage af-
fected stakeholders? 
The widespread availability of the technology may create particular 
governance challenges, as numerous laboratories are able to experiment 
with engineering similar organisms, potentially resulting in multiple new 
species enhanced with different characteristics aimed at accomplishing dif-
ferent goals.46 These new capabilities shine light on the direct role of human 
decision making in guiding the trajectory of species and ecosystems. The 
direct links to, and occasional conflicts with, existing environmental and 
natural resource regulatory schemes call for a more robust system of gov-
ernance that oversees the use of CRISPR. 
II. THE EXISTING BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The existing system of biotechnology governance is unprepared to ad-
equately answer the questions posed by gene editing, in part because the 
technology has quickly surpassed the bounds once thought possible, and in 
part because the regulatory system is premised on a narrow set of considera-
tions designed to foster advances in the field of biotechnology while man-
aging prospective risks. Early regulatory responses to proposals for releas-
ing genetically-engineered organisms indicate how the current biotechnolo-
gy governance system will apply to the upcoming wave of gene editing ap-
plications. This section provides an overview of the existing framework for 
biotechnology governance in the United States, analyzes case studies apply-
ing this framework to the recent advancements in genetic engineering, and 
identifies regulatory gaps exposed by these case studies.47 
The Reagan Administration established the Coordinated Framework 
for Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated Framework”) in 1986 to 
clarify agency roles under existing law, streamline agency collaboration, 
                                                                                                                           
10,565 (Aug. 25, 2015) (stating that “[t]he question is no longer whether we can control invasive 
species using gene drive, but whether we should”). 
 46 See David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and 
Germline Gene Modification, 348 SCIENCE 36, 36 (Apr. 3, 2015) (stating that “[t]he simplicity of 
the CRISPR-Cas9 system allows any researcher with knowledge of molecular biology to modify 
genomes, making feasible experiments that were previously difficult or impossible to conduct”). 
 47 See infra notes 48–99 and accompanying text. 
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and avoid overlapping regulations.48 Two key decisions provide the founda-
tion for the Coordinated Framework. First, the Reagan Administration pri-
oritized safety and risk, primarily to human health and agriculture, when 
evaluating the use of genetic engineering.49 Second, government officials 
concluded that biotechnology is not “inherently risky,” and thus opted to 
evaluate the safety and risk of individual genetically-altered products on a 
case-by-case basis.50 Governance decisions do not turn on the fact that sci-
entists engineered the change, or the potential evolutionary impacts of the 
genetic changes.51 These conclusions supported reliance on existing law to 
oversee biotechnology products.52 The Coordinated Framework continues 
to define the United States approach to biotechnology governance. The de-
cision to prioritize risk management over other concerns and the focus on 
products (in other words, the organism and any risks it may pose) rather 
than the fact that the organism was genetically-modified remain sources of 
conflict in debates regarding genetic engineering.53 
The Obama Administration’s 2017 Update to the Coordinated Frame-
work reiterates the view that the product-specific, risk-based approach ade-
quately addresses both health and environmental risks of biotechnology 
products.54 Rather than suggesting revisions to the regulatory system, the 
update focuses on increasing transparency, clarifying agency authority, and 
reducing regulatory hurdles.55 The update “describes the types of biotechnol-
ogy product areas regulated by the various components within each primary 
regulatory agency (i.e., EPA, FDA, or USDA)” and outlines each agency’s 
responsibility when a particular type of product falls within the scope of 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See generally Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23,302 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework]. 
 49 See, e.g., id. at 23,303 (requiring that regulatory reviews deem a new product to be safe 
before it can be commercialized).  
 50 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE 
AND REGULATION 25 (2000) [hereinafter GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS]. For example, the FDA 
considers development of new plant varieties as a “continuum” that includes selective breeding 
and genetic engineering. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 22, 984, 22,985–86 (May 29, 1991). The obligation to ensure that new food products are safe 
applies anywhere along that continuum. Id. at 22,985. 
 51 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,985–86. 
 52 See Coordinated Framework, supra note 48, at 23,303 (stating that existing laws are suffi-
cient to regulate most new biotechnology). 
 53 Jennifer Kuzma et al., Evaluating Oversight Systems for Emerging Technologies: A Case 
Study of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546, 549 (2009); see GENE 
DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that “[g]enetic engineering sparked ethical 
debate as soon as it was imagined”); Grunert, supra note 43 (noting the risks of unregulated use of 
CRISPR). 
 54 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 5. 
 55 Id. at 2, 5. 
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more than one agency.56 The update also clarifies the timeline of review to 
minimize delays and support innovation, by “discuss[ing] provisions for 
future review of the Coordinated Framework.”57 
The 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework includes hypothetical 
biotechnology products to demonstrate how the regulatory system might 
apply.58 Notably, the hypotheticals do not specify examples of products de-
veloped via gene editing technologies despite the growing prevalence of 
CRISPR during the 18-month process of producing the update.59 The hypo-
theticals also fail to provide clear guidance regarding when a product trig-
gers collaboration among the three agencies, or which agency takes the lead 
in initiating the collaborations.60 
The National Strategy for Modernizing the Regulatory System for Bio-
technology Products (“National Strategy”), released in 2016, complements 
the update to the Coordinated Framework by “develop[ing] a long-term 
strategy to ensure that the Federal regulatory system is equipped to effi-
ciently assess the risks, if any, of the future products of biotechnology.”61 
Like the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework, the National Strategy 
does not specifically address new risks raised by CRISPR and other recent 
advancements in biotechnology.62 Instead, the report identifies general op-
tions for future actions ranging from holding stakeholder meetings to “ex-
plor[ing] mechanisms to enhance coordination” among the agencies.63 
The FDA, Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) have primary responsibility for biotechnology 
governance, applying existing statutes to perform product-specific risk-
based assessments. Whether a genetically-engineered product falls within 
an agency’s respective jurisdiction depends on the type of organism, how 
the genetic modification occurred and the intended uses of the modified 
product. The FDA considers whether a genetically-altered plant, animal, or 
other organism poses a health risk to humans or animals. The FDA also 
oversees gene therapy and human genome editing, applying higher levels of 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. at 2. When necessary, the agencies are to form ad hoc working groups potentially in-
cluding members outside the three agencies for additional expertise. Id. at 36. The update provides 
examples to provide specific, non-binding mechanisms to guide agency collaboration. Id. at 37–
38. 
 57 Id. at 2. 
 58 Id. at 39–51. 
 59 The Executive Office of the President launched the update process on July 2, 2015. Id. at 1. 
 60 Id. at 36, 39. 
 61 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY 
SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 4 (Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2016-12/documents/biotech_national_strategy_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM79-7GQT]. 
 62 See generally id. 
 63 Id. at 12, 19. 
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scrutiny to gene editing intended for direct human applications.64 The 
USDA focuses on potential harm to agricultural plants and animals. The 
EPA regulates new genetically-engineered products if they meet the defini-
tion of a pesticide or produce “new chemical substances” that are not oth-
erwise regulated by the FDA or USDA. The following subsections provide 
an overview of each agency’s role in biotechnology governance and recent 
developments to address advances in gene editing. 
A. FDA Oversight 
The FDA oversees three primary categories of genetically-engineered 
products: (1) human drugs and medical products, (2) animal drugs, and (3) 
foods derived from plants.65 The applicable laws generally require pre-
market approval of drugs, biological products, medical devices, food addi-
tives, and dietary supplements.66 
Consistent with the Coordinated Framework’s focus on the characteris-
tics of a product rather than the biotechnology process used to develop the 
product, the FDA evaluates the safety and effectiveness of covered products 
regardless of the technique used to produce the products.67 Recognizing 
                                                                                                                           
 64 There is a ban on federal funding for human genome editing. Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114−113, 129 Stat. 2242, 749 (adopted Dec. 18, 2015) (banning federal funding 
of “research in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable 
genetic modification”); Francis S. Collins, Dir. of Nat’l Insts. of Health, Statement on NIH Funding 
of Research Using Gene-Editing Technologies in Human Embryos, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Apr. 
28, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-nih-funding-
research-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/3B3B-34G2]. 
 65 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act focuses on food safety and the safety and effec-
tiveness of human and animal drugs. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 
52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2018)); 2017 Update to Coordinat-
ed Framework, supra note 41, at 9 tbl.1. The Public Health Service Act governs the safety of 
biological products developed for “the prevention, treatment, or cure of diseases or injuries of 
man,” including but not limited to viruses, vaccines, and blood. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. 
No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2018)). The FDA may 
also regulate biotechnology products involving cosmetics, foods and food additives, dietary sup-
plements, tobacco products, new animal drugs, and drugs and devices. What Does FDA Regulate?, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm194879.htm [https://
perma.cc/F8T4-AKDY]. The FDA also addresses other angles of biotechnology—for example, 
valid nutritional and health claims. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C §§ 301, 341, 348, 350–364, 387a (2018) 
(stating the FDA’s authority to regulate various biotechnology products). 
 66 Food additives do not require pre-market approval if they are classified as “generally rec-
ognized as safe” for their intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s). 
 67 For example, the FDA’s method to evaluate “foods derived from new plant varieties, in-
clud[es] those developed by recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques.” Robert M. Califf & Ritu Nalu-
bola, FDA’s Science-based Approach to Genome Edited Products, FDA VOICE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/01/fdas-science-based-approach-to-genome-edited-
products/ [https://perma.cc/PE6V-L67Q]. The FDA’s regulation of biological products includes 
products produced via gene editing. Id. 
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uncertainties regarding approval of biotechnology products, the agency es-
tablished a voluntary pre-market consultation process for foods derived 
from genetically-engineered products.68 The FDA has yet to complete a 
consultation for foods derived from a plant produced from gene editing.69 
Of the three agencies with primary oversight of biotechnology products, 
the FDA has been the most active in updating regulations to address advances 
in gene editing.70 The agency released two draft guidance documents in early 
2017 aimed at updating its approach to genetically-engineered animals and 
mosquito-related products, and requested comments regarding regulation of 
gene editing in plants.71 As discussed below, these steps would expand the 
definition of “animal drug” to subject gene editing of animals to additional 
regulatory review.72 
B. USDA Oversight 
The USDA’s role in biotechnology governance is rooted in its authori-
ty to control animal and plant pests pursuant to the Animal Health Protec-
tion Act (“AHPA”) and Plant Protection Act (“PPA”).73 The AHPA requires 
the USDA to prohibit or restrict the importation into the United States and 
transportation across state lines of any pests or disease-causing organisms in 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Consultation Procedures Under FDA’s 1992 Statement of Policy—Foods Derived from 
New Plant Varieties, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (revised Oct. 1997), https://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Biotechnology/ucm096126.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CF47-CAUA] [hereinafter 1992 Consultation Procedures]; see Biotechnology 
Consultations on Food from GE Plant Varieties, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/fdcc/?set=Biocon [https://perma.cc/5JBZ-NXFM] (listing records of biotechnology 
consultations that used the FDA’s 1992 consultation procedures). 
 69 See 1992 Consultation Procedures, supra note 68 (detailing the process that developers of 
biotechnology products may use to consult with the FDA prior to market release). 
 70 Q&A on FDA Regulation of Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA in Animals, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/developmentapprovalprocess/geneticengineering/
geneticallyengineeredanimals/ucm113605.htm [https://perma.cc/HRD4-YRB2]. 
 71 See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLARIFICATION OF FDA AND EPA JURISDICTION 
OVER MOSQUITO-RELATED PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (Oct. 2017), https://www.fda.
gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM5
33600.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6EA-CVQH] [hereinafter FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE]; 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REGULATION OF INTENTIONALLY ALTERED 
GENOMIC DNA IN ANIMALS, DRAFT GUIDANCE (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C6H4-MFSU] [hereinafter FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE]; FDA Requests 
Comments on Documents Related to Certain Biotechnology and Mosquito-related Products, FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm536949.
htm [https://perma.cc/PB48-YKG7]. 
 72 FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 4−7. 
 73 Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2018); Animal Health Protection Act, 7 
U.S.C. §§ 8301–8322 (2018). 
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livestock populations, including animals that may present a risk of transmit-
ting such pests or diseases.74 The agency conducts an animal health risk 
assessment to determine if genetically-engineered animals present a risk to 
livestock health.75 If so, the genetically-engineered organism is subject to 
import or transport restrictions.76 Genetically-engineered insects may also 
fall under AHPA provisions if there is a risk they could spread livestock dis-
eases.77 The PPA requires the USDA to control plant pests and noxious 
weeds.78 Importantly for gene editing governance, PPA regulations presume 
that genetically-engineered organisms include foreign DNA—a characteris-
tic of earlier genetic engineering techniques.79 Other genetically-engineered 
organisms may also be subject to regulation if they are unclassified under 
the PPA, the classification is unknown, or they “contain[] such an organism, 
or any other organism or product altered or produced through genetic engi-
neering which the [USDA] Administrator, determines is a plant pest or has 
reason to believe is a plant pest.”80 If a genetically-engineered organism is 
subject to PPA regulations, the USDA requires notification prior to the im-
portation, interstate transport, or release of a covered plant pest or noxious 
weed.81 Entities may petition for an exemption by demonstrating that the 
product is not a plant pest.82 
                                                                                                                           
 74 7 U.S.C. §§ 8303, 8305. 
 75 See id. § 8303. 
 76 Id.; 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 (2018). 
 77 7 U.S.C. § 8302 (13). 
 78 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2018). Statutory definitions of “plant pest” and “noxious weed” are quite 
broad. See id. §§ 7702 (10) (defining a “noxious weed” as “any plant or plant product that can 
directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to crops (including nursery stock or plant products), 
livestock, poultry, or other interests of agriculture, irrigation, navigation, the natural resources of 
the United States, the public health, or the environment”), 7702 (14) (defining “plant pest” as “any 
living state of any of the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause 
disease in any plant or plant product: (A) a protozoan; (B) a nonhuman animal; (C) a parasitic 
plant; (D) a bacterium; (E) a fungus; (F) a virus or viroid; (G) an infectious agent or other patho-
gen; (H) any article similar to or allied with any of the articles specified in the preceding subpara-
graphs”). 
 79 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (defining a “regulated article” as “[a]ny organism which has been 
altered or produced through genetic engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or 
vector or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa designated in § 340.2 and meets the definition 
of plant pest”). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. § 340.0. 
 82 Importation, Interstate Movement, and Environmental Release of Certain Genetically Engi-
neered Organisms, 82 Fed. Reg. 7008, 7016 (Jan. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Import and Release of GE 
Organisms]. 
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In January 2017, the USDA proposed new PPA regulations to adapt to 
advances in the field of biotechnology.83 If approved, this would be the first 
comprehensive revision of the regulations since they were established in 
1987.84 Under the proposed rule, the USDA would make an initial determi-
nation whether a genetically-engineered organism poses a plant pest or nox-
ious weed risk rather than impose permitting requirements and allow enti-
ties to petition for exemptions.85 The proposal maintains the focus on genet-
ically-engineered products rather than the process; therefore, only those 
products that pose a plant risk or noxious weed risk would be subject to 
regulation.86 
C. EPA Oversight 
The EPA’s role in biotechnology governance focuses primarily on pes-
ticides and toxic materials. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodent-
icide Act (“FIFRA”) requires the agency to regulate “the distribution, sale, 
or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered . . . .”87 Pesticides 
include “any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, 
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, . . . [or] intended for use as a 
plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, [or] nitrogen stabilizer . . . .”88 The 
EPA must determine that the pesticide in question presents no “unreasona-
ble adverse effects on the environment” prior to its sale or distribution.89 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) tasks the EPA 
with establishing the amount of pesticide chemical residues that may be 
present in food and to “determine[] that there is a reasonable certainty that 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See generally APHIS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: APHIS REQUESTS PUBLIC INPUT ON NEXT 
STEPS TOWARDS REVISION OF ITS BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS (Jan. 2017), https://www.aphis.
usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/340/q&a_biotech-reg-revisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTH8-
K7CA] [hereinafter APHIS Q&A]. 
 84 Id. In 2008, APHIS proposed a multi-tiered permit system and a significant expansion of 
agency regulatory authority revisions. Import and Release of GE Organisms, supra note 82, at 
7011. The proposed revisions were rejected due to a lack of detail regarding which organisms 
would fall under regulatory control. Id. The failure of that proposal informed the revisions includ-
ed in the current proposal. Id. at 7011–12. 
 85 APHIS Q&A, supra note 83. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2018). 
 88 Id. § 136(u). 
 89 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and Federal Facilities, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/federal-insecticide-fungicide-and-rodenticide-
act-fifra-and-federal-facilities#Summary [https://perma.cc/TX56-9QRK]. Unreasonable adverse 
effects may include: (1) products that cause unreasonable risk to humans or the environment and 
(2) “a human dietary risk from residues that result from the use of a pesticide in or on any food 
inconsistent with the standard under section 346a of title 21.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). 
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no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical resi-
due, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for 
which there is reliable information.”90 The tolerance levels set by the EPA 
apply to both domestic and imported foods.91 The EPA has the ability to 
alter either the tolerance or tolerance exemption levels, and the FDA must 
follow the levels set by the EPA.92 
The EPA also regulates certain biotechnology products pursuant to the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).93 For example, the TSCA applies 
to plant-incorporated protectants (“PIPs”), genetically-modified microbial 
pesticides, herbicide tolerant crops, and intergeneric microorganisms.94 Alt-
hough some plants naturally produce defenses against pests, these TSCA-
regulated organisms are modified to “express[] pesticidal properties by pro-
ducing a bacterial protein that will protect the plants from specific in-
sects.”95 In the case of herbicide-tolerant crops, the EPA regulates the herbi-
cide even though the plant falls under USDA jurisdiction and the FDA is 
responsible for regulating the food produced from the plant.96 The EPA sets 
the tolerance levels for the herbicide, ensuring that the levels comply with 
the legal limits of pesticide residue.97 
Although the 2016 amendments to TSCA do not specifically pertain to 
biotechnology, the law requires alterations in the review process that require 
“an affirmative finding on the safety of new chemical substances . . . before 
they are allowed into the marketplace.”98 This finding includes populations 
                                                                                                                           
 90 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). 
 91 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Chapter 11—Tolerance Petitions, in PESTICIDE REGISTRATION MAN-
UAL, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/pesticide-registration-manual-chapter-11-tolerance-
petitions#main-content [https://perma.cc/H4QM-5YLU]. 
 92 21 U.S.C. § 346a. 
 93 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2018). The TSCA aims to “[p]re-
vent the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemical substanc-
es, or any combination of such activities with such substances, from presenting an unreasonable 
risk to potentially exposed or susceptible population, without consideration of costs or other non-
risk factors.” 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 9. 
 94 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 13. Intergeneric organisms are 
“[m]icroorganisms formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material from organisms clas-
sified in different taxonomic genera, including microorganisms constructed with synthetic genes 
not identical to DNA that would be derived from the same genus as the recipient . . . .” Id. 
 95 EPA’s Regulation of Biotechnology for Use in Pest Management, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/regulation-biotechnology-under-tsca-and-fifra/epas-regulation-biotechnology-
use-pest-management [https://perma.cc/RLS6-MHJP]. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 14; Regulatory Determinations 
Made Under Section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/reviewing-new-chemicals-under-toxic-substances-control-act-tsca/regulatory-determ
inations-made-under [https://perma.cc/N23K-5NP5]. 
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that may be affected other than the one intended.99 Unlike the FDA and 
USDA, the EPA has not proposed any updates to its biotechnology regulato-
ry framework to address new gene editing technologies. 
III. GAPS IN GENE EDITING GOVERNANCE 
A 2017 National Academy of Sciences study, produced at the request 
of the White House Office of Science and Technology, considered the future 
of biotechnology as part of the process for updating the Coordinated 
Framework.100 The study identified additional regulatory gaps and resource 
needs.101 For example, the report concludes that the FDA, the USDA, and 
the EPA “lack the expertise and resources to effectively address the rise in 
biotechnology products.”102 The report recommends a single entry point for 
categories of genetically-engineered products to better streamline and iden-
tify circumstances that require more complex risk assessments.103 Addition-
ally, the report raises concerns regarding new types of biotechnology prod-
ucts not previously encountered, such as toys or pets, and suggests that 
newer products require a completely new approach to risk analysis because 
they will be so different from those that currently exist.104 The study also 
notes that “[existing] statutes may not empower regulators to require prod-
uct developers to share in the burden of generating information about prod-
uct safety . . . .”105 
These issues remain unaddressed. For example, the FDA’s draft guid-
ance concerning genetically-engineered mosquitoes seeks to clarify the cir-
cumstances under which the FDA or EPA would act as the lead agency in 
the future. The guidance proposes that the FDA would oversee “products 
that limit disease transmission or modify mosquitoes in non-lethal ways.”106 
The FDA argues that products engineered to reduce the size of a mosquito 
population should be considered pesticides rather than a new animal drug, 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 13 (noting the considera-
tion of “potentially exposed or susceptible population[s]”). 
 100 PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 67–70. 
 101 Id. at 98–102. 
 102 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 5–6. 
 103 Id. at 9−10. 
 104 Id. at 11. 
 105 Id. at 173. 
 106 Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, New Biotech Regulations Require Balance of Safety and 
Innovation, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2017/03/03/new-biotech-regulations-require-balance-of-safety-and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/
M6PA-RWAV]; see FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 5 (differentiating be-
tween FDA regulation of new animal drugs and EPA regulation of pesticide products). 
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thereby falling under the EPA’s jurisdiction pursuant to the FIFRA.107 Alt-
hough the goal of the document is to separate unnecessary overlap between 
the EPA and the FDA, it identifies some situations when the FDA may con-
sult with the EPA.108 As of the publication of this Article, the EPA has not 
weighed in on the question. Unless the proposed guidance receives final 
approval, releases of gene-edited insects and animals will continue to fall 
within the FDA’s jurisdiction if the modified organism could directly impact 
human health. 
Early examples of agencies applying existing law to gene-edited or-
ganisms expose four additional regulatory gaps that extend beyond those 
identified by the National Academy report. The first, a gap in regulatory 
oversight, is exposed by the recent advances in gene editing. The remaining 
three—minimal consideration of ecological impacts, regulators’ inability to 
consider alternatives, and a failure to assess and respond to competing ideo-
logies—have been evident for quite some time but are exacerbated by the 
accessibility and far-reaching impacts of CRISPR. These gaps demonstrate 
that the deficiencies in biotechnology governance require more than addi-
tional resources, expertise, and coordination. Instead, addressing these is-
sues requires rethinking the nation’s approach to biotechnology governance 
and the goals and values that guide agencies as they evaluate the next wave 
of genetically-modified organisms.  
A. Regulatory Oversight 
Despite recent efforts to update and enhance the coordination among 
the relevant agencies, some gene-edited products fall outside the scope of 
existing regulation.109 Deleting an organism’s own genes, rather than insert-
ing foreign DNA, may alter the species and potentially its ecosystem, but it 
may not increase the direct risks the organism poses to human or animal 
health.110 Choosing not to regulate certain products may be appropriate. As 
                                                                                                                           
 107 FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 5–6; see Karsten & West, supra 
note 106 (noting a proposal that would give the EPA authority over genetically-engineered prod-
ucts that limit or eliminate mosquitos and the FDA authority over products that inhibit mosquito-
borne diseases or alter mosquitoes without complete elimination). 
 108 FDA MOSQUITO DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6. 
 109 FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6, 8–9; Maxmen, supra note 39; 
see Jennifer Kuzma, Reboot the Debate on Genetic Engineering, 531 NATURE 165, 166 (2016), 
(noting that approximately twenty genetically-engineered plants have escaped USDA regulatory 
review since 2011). 
 110 See Import and Release of GE Organisms, supra note 82, at 7015−16 (stating that new 
genetic-engineering techniques that delete an organism’s own genes simply speed up results of 
ordinary breeding, and therefore the risk is comparable to ordinary breeding, thus finding no in-
herent increased risks). 
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it stands, however, that choice occurs by default because drafters of existing 
laws and regulations did not imagine the new options for editing genes—
hardly an appropriate rationale for declining to govern a new technology 
with potentially profound cultural, economic, and ecological implications. 
1. Mushrooms and Corn 
In April 2016, the USDA determined that a CRISPR-edited white but-
ton mushroom modified to reduce browning and a variety of waxy corn  
that increases the starch content in the kernels are not subject to review by 
the agency. These were the USDA’s first considerations of agricultural 
products edited via CRISPR.111 In both cases, the USDA’s Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) concluded that there is “no reason to 
believe” that CRISPR-edited white button mushrooms or waxy corn are 
plant pests as defined by the PPA.112 Neither product triggered EPA regula-
tion because they did not produce pesticides or toxic materials.113 The FDA 
did not have jurisdiction over the crop itself, but can oversee the product at 
a later date if the developer decides to bring the mushroom to market.114 
The gene-edited white button mushroom and waxy corn join a growing 
number of genetically-engineered agricultural products considered non-
regulated articles under the USDA regulations, highlighting how recent 
technologies are beginning to fall outside the scope of the USDA’s product-
                                                                                                                           
 111 Letter from Michael J. Firko, Deputy Director, APHIS, to Dr. Daria H. Schmidt (Apr. 18, 
2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/reg_loi/15-352-01_air_response_signed.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4ALR-WMKQ] [hereinafter USDA Waxy Corn Letter]; Letter from Michael 
J. Firko, Deputy Director, APHIS, to Dr. Yinong Yang (Apr. 13, 2016), (https://www.aphis.usda.gov/
biotechnology/downloads/reg_loi/15-321-01_air_response_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2PX-
XLH9] [hereinafter USDA White Button Mushroom Letter]; see Emily Waltz, CRISPR-Edited 
Crops Free to Enter Market, Skip Regulation, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 582, 582 (2016) 
(stating that “[t]he first CRISPR-edited crops presented to the US regulatory system can be cultivated 
and sold without oversight by the [USDA]”). The USDA subsequently announced that it would not 
regulate gene-edited crops “that could otherwise have been developed through traditional breeding 
techniques as long as they are developed without the use of a plant pest as the donor or vector and 
they are not themselves plant pests.” Details on USDA Plant Breeding Innovations, U.S. DEP’T 
AGRIC. (June 14, 2018), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/brs-news-and-
information/2018_brs_news/pbi-details [https://perma.cc/CT5W-QDHV]. 
 112 USDA Waxy Corn Letter, supra note 111, at 2; USDA White Button Mushroom Letter, 
supra note 111, at 2; cf. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7702 (14) (2018) (defining plant pests). 
 113 See USDA Waxy Corn Letter, supra note 111, at 2 (noting that the engineered corn is not 
subject to regulation under 7 C.F.R. § 340); USDA White Button Mushroom Letter, supra note 
111, at 2 (noting that the engineered mushroom is not subject to regulation under 7 C.F.R. § 340). 
 114 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1), 348 (2018) (stating that substances that are not added to food 
are not considered “adulterated” if they are not harmful to health and, therefore, not subject to 
FDA regulation). 
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based regulations.115 APHIS’s reasoning regarding CRISPR could lead to a 
growing class of genetically-engineered food products that falls outside 
USDA jurisdiction.116 
2. The Hornless Cow 
A gene-edited hornless cow may provide the next test of the biotech-
nology governance system. The genetic modification to create hornless 
dairy cows, which the developers promote as improving animal welfare and 
farmer safety, inserts a gene from an existing breed of hornless beef cattle 
into a breed of dairy cattle.117 Recombinetics, Inc., the firm seeking to mar-
ket the hornless cows, bases its arguments on a selective breeding analogy 
for gene editing.118 Proponents of this viewpoint argue that editing an or-
ganism’s genetic code by removing or altering specific strands of DNA is 
simply speeding up the selective breeding process farmers have used for 
thousands of years; in other words, there is nothing harmful about the pro-
cess.119 Furthermore, because selective breeding is perfectly legal, new 
techniques that achieve the same result should be legal as well. 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Emily Waltz, Gene-Edited CRISPR Mushroom Escapes US Regulation, 532 NATURE 293, 
293 (2016). For example, the USDA approved a genetically-engineered potato that reduces 
browning and bruising. Determination of Nonregulated Status of Genetically Engineered Potato, 
80 Fed. Reg. 53,101, 53,101 (Sept. 2, 2015). Unlike traditional genetically-modified crops, how-
ever, this technique only contains a trace of foreign DNA—a key trigger for USDA regulation. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT DECISION AND FINDING OF NO SIG-
NIFICANT IMPACT: X17 AND Y9 POTATOES WITH LATE BLIGHT RESISTANCE, LOW ACRYLAMIDE 
POTENTIAL, LOWERED REDUCED SUGARS, AND REDUCED BLACK SPOT (16-064-01p), at 5 (Oct. 
28, 2016). The agency has also approved an apple designed to resist browning using a similar 
technique. Preliminary Determination for an Extension of a Determination of Nonregulated Status 
for Non-Browning Artic Apple Event NF872 Apple, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,396, 53,396 (Aug. 12, 2016). 
 116 See USDA Waxy Corn Letter, supra note 111, at 2 (stating that “given the speed, ease, and 
wide use of CRISPR gene-editing, many other crops are sure to follow [the CRISPR-edited waxy 
corn]”); Melody M. Bomgardner, CRISPR: A New Toolbox for Better Crops, 95 CHEM. & ENG’G 
NEWS 30, 30–34 (2017) (noting that “questions persist” regarding regulation and that the USDA 
commented that “it does not have the authority to regulate” plants that do not contain certain gene-
edited plants that “do not contain foreign genes”). 
 117 PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 45; 
DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE RESEARCH, EDUC., & INFO. SYS., IMPROVEMENT OF DIARY ANIMAL 
WELL-BEING BY GENETIC DEHORNING, https://portal.nifa.usda.gov/web/crisprojectpages/1005738-
improvement-of-diary-animal-well-being-by-genetic-dehorning.html [https://perma.cc/2XL2-YSSY] 
[hereinafter DAIRY ANIMAL WELL-BEING]. The dehorning method utilizes a gene editing tech-
nique referred to as “transcription activator-like effector nucleases” rather than CRISPR. DAIRY 
ANIMAL WELL-BEING, supra. 
 118 DAIRY ANIMAL WELL-BEING, supra note 117. 
 119 See, e.g., Luisa Bortesi & Rainer Fischer, The CRISPR/Cas9 System for Plant Genome Edit-
ing and Beyond, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 41, 48–49 (2015) (noting that genome editing both 
speeds up and increases the efficiency of “conventional breeding”); Harry Pettit, Genetically-
Modified Cows Without Horns Are Created to Make the Countryside Safer, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 20, 
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The selective breeding narrative argues for little or no additional regu-
lation due to the genetic similarities between a product edited using 
CRISPR and a product developed over multiple generations using conven-
tional breeding techniques. It also situates CRISPR within a context famil-
iar and nonthreatening. This lens calls into question the justifications for 
regulating a CRISPR-edited organism, as well as the notion of what it 
means to label a product as “natural.”120 If CRISPR is analogous to selec-
tive breeding or natural selection, it follows that gene-edited organisms are 
no less natural than their counterparts that could foster similar genetic 
changes through conventional reproduction. 
The selective breeding analogy calls for limited oversight, even in cir-
cumstances where genetic alteration could foster irreversible impacts to 
species and the environment. Adopting this perspective would likely lead to 
the development of edited organisms that extend well beyond those neces-
sary to protect vexing health and ecological issues. It is easy to imagine, for 
example, the multibillion-dollar pest control industry deploying gene edit-
ing to eradicate insects that are nuisances but do not pose threats to human 
health or agricultural products. 
The argument has its limitations, as there are important differences be-
tween CRISPR and selective breeding. Selective breeding takes time and 
allows ecosystems and systems of governance to adjust. Gene editing 
speeds the process, allowing it to outpace traditional regulatory responses. 
Gene editing also allows a relatively small number of scientists to guide 
how evolution occurs. Furthermore, genetic modifications may produce 
different results than conventional breeding.121 
The FDA proposed a different tack that, if implemented, could provide 
a model for stretching existing statutory language to address advances in 
biotechnology. In January 2017, immediately prior to the end of the Obama 
presidency, the FDA released new draft guidance that would apply to Re-
combinetics’s hornless cows.122 The proposal expands the definition of “new 
                                                                                                                           
2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4242148/Genetically-modified-hornless-cows-
developed-scientists.html [https://perma.cc/6E43-THJF] (noting that developers of a gene-edited 
hornless dairy cow “compare their genetic modification methods to that of selective breeding”). 
 120 See generally William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the 
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69, 69–90 
(William Cronon ed. 1995) (explaining how the terms “wilderness” and “nature” originated and 
why their current meanings may lead to misconceptions for environmentalists). 
 121 See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2234 
(2004) (“[G]enetic modification may cause different effects than those caused by conventional 
breeding.”). 
 122 FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6–8; Maxmen, supra note 39. 
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animal drug” under the FDCA to include “animals with intentionally altered 
genomic DNA developed through use of genome editing technologies, as 
well as techniques such as rDNA in genetic engineering.”123 The FDA justi-
fies the expanded definition because genetic engineering alters the “structure 
or function of the animal.”124 The guidance applies to non-heritable gene 
edits, but is primarily aimed at addressing heritable (germline) edits.125 The 
regulatory change would subject both the animal initially altered (“the 
founder animal”) and the “entire subsequent lineage of animals that con-
tains the genomic alteration” to the FDCA’s pre-market approval require-
ments—a process some stakeholders argue would discourage beneficial us-
es of gene editing due to the length of the FDA’s review.126 
This draft guidance signals a partial departure from the presumption 
that biotechnology is not inherently risky. Although it maintains the risk-
based, case-by-case assessment of new products, the expanded definition of 
animal drug would establish a rebuttable presumption that genetically-
modified animals are subject to FDA regulation. This issue remains unset-
tled, however. Because gene editing does not insert foreign DNA into ani-
mals, the FDA requested public comment regarding the risks associated 
with technologies such as CRISPR to determine whether they should be 
subject to the expanded animal drug definition.127 
Relying on the natural selection analogy, Recombinetics contends that 
the FDA should consider the hornless cows as “generally recognized as safe” 
and therefore allow marketing without FDA approval.128 Recombinetics ex-
ecutives believe that the USDA’s reasoning in the CRISPR mushroom and 
waxy corn cases should apply in this case as well, arguing that the cows 
should not face FDA review simply because an edited gene was “intention-
                                                                                                                           
 123 Animals with Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEnginee
redAnimals/default.htm [https://perma.cc/79VZ-C5ST]. 
 124 FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 7. The animal itself is not consid-
ered the drug. Rather the genetically-engineered animals are regulated as containing “new animal 
drugs.” Id. 
 125 Id. at 4 (stating that “[a]lthough much of this guidance will be relevant to non-heritable 
intentionally altered genomic DNA, this guidance primarily addresses heritable intentionally al-
tered genomic DNA”). 
 126 Id. at 3. The proposed guidance document identifies seven elements required for the ap-
proval process of “new animal drugs”: (i) product definition, (ii) molecular characterization of the 
intentional alteration, (iii) molecular characterization of the lineage animal, (iv) phenotypic char-
acterization of the animal, (v) durability assessment and plan, (vi) environmental and food safety, 
and (vii) claim validation. Id. at 22–27. 
 127 Id. at 14. 
 128 Maxmen, supra note 39. According to Recombinetics, gene editing provides “a simple, 
direct, rapid solution” to the animal welfare concerns regarding dehorning. DAIRY ANIMAL WELL-
BEING, supra note 117. 
2402 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2377 
ally put it into the cows’ DNA.”129 The FDA has not made a final determi-
nation regarding the hornless cow or the draft guidance. The outcomes of 
both will be important indications of how the current legal system will re-
spond to the evolving field of gene editing. 
B. Ecological Impacts 
A second gap in the biotechnology governance framework is the lack 
of a comprehensive system for evaluating the ecological impacts of gene-
edited organisms. As the USDA notes, a rigid distinction between products 
that are plant pests and those that are not fails to sufficiently identify all of 
the plant risks that the products present to other plants or plant products.130 
Rather than directly address the scope of ecological considerations that 
should inform regulators as they consider approval of genetically-modified 
organisms, the FDA and USDA rely primarily on the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (“NEPA”) to assess environmental impacts.131 NEPA serves 
an important function by requiring entities to collect data, evaluate potential 
environmental impacts, and provide the public with an opportunity to sub-
mit comments prior to issuing a final decision.132 NEPA does not, however, 
mandate any specific action after evaluating environmental impacts, thus 
failing to provide any guidance regarding the types of environmental risks 
that are acceptable.133 Nor do existing statutes applicable in the biotechnol-
ogy context address broader ecological impacts. USDA regulations, for ex-
ample, fail to address questions regarding the release of genetically-
modified organisms (“GMOs”) intended to minimize the potential for envi-
ronmental risk that may occur after the release of genetically-engineered 
products.134 
The following subsections use two recent examples of NEPA review 
prior to the release of genetically-modified insects to demonstrate how the 
law applies in the biotechnology context and explore the limitations of reli-
ance on NEPA as the primary means of considering the ecological impacts 
of gene-edited organisms.  
                                                                                                                           
 129 Maxmen, supra note 39. 
 130 PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 96, 98. 
 131 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2018); see 2017 Update to 
Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 21−22 (stating that both the USDA and FDA still 
comply with NEPA requirements when they are applicable). 
 132 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 22−23; see Victor B. Flatt, The 
“Worst Case” May Be the Best: Rethinking NEPA Law to Avoid Future Environmental Disasters, 
6 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 25, 32–36 (2011) (describing the requirements of an environ-
mental impact study under NEPA). 
 133 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
 134 Angelo, supra note 40, at 136–37. 
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1. Mosquitoes and Moths 
In August 2016, the FDA approved a proposed field test of genetically-
modified Aedes aegypti mosquitoes on the island of Key Haven, Florida—
the first modified animal approved for release by the FDA.135 Oxitec, the 
sponsor of the proposed field trial, used recombinant DNA to alter genes of 
male mosquitoes to prevent their offspring from reaching maturity (referred 
to as a “self-limiting” gene).136 Although the proposed trial utilizes trans-
genic modifications (inserting foreign DNA into the male mosquitoes) ra-
ther than gene editing via CRISPR, the FDA’s approach to the proposed 
trial will likely apply to any future proposals to release organisms modified 
via gene editing techniques.137 
In addition to the FDA’s approval, the Florida Keys Mosquito Control 
District allowed local residents to vote on a nonbinding resolution regarding 
approval of the proposed trial, offering one ballot referendum for residents 
living in the area where the mosquitoes would be released and another ref-
erendum for all residents of the surrounding county.138 Voters split on the 
issue when it was added to a ballot referendum.139 Residents living in the 
area where the mosquitoes were to be released voted against the trial, 
whereas residents in the surrounding county approved the referendum.140 
Oxitec executives subsequently announced the company would work with 
the FDA to identify an alternate release site.141 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Susan Milius, FDA OKs First GM Mosquito Trial in U.S. but Hurdles Remain, SCI. NEWS 
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/fda-oks-first-gm-mosquito-trial-us-hurdles-
remain [https://perma.cc/LC47-JS2Z]. 
 136 FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16, 18, 21; see Friendly 
Mosquitoes, OXITEC, https://www.oxitec.com/friendly-mosquitoes/ [https://perma.cc/TUD3-H6ZT] 
(describing Oxitec’s proposed trial). 
 137 See FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that 
Oxitec’s mosquitoes include a “recombinant DNA (rDNA) construct”). 
 138 GMO Mosquito Plan Headed for Residents’ Vote in Florida Keys, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Apr. 20, 2016), https://apnews.com/cbc584373614495c9df8703a61c6b6ac [https://perma.cc/
97R3-YHHB] [hereinafter GMO Mosquito Plan Vote]; Ike Swetlitz, Genetically Modified Mos-
quitoes Are One Step Closer to Being Released in Florida, STAT (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.
statnews.com/2016/08/05/mosquitoes-genetically-modified-florida-zika/ [https://perma.cc/VT6W-
2VEN]. 
 139 Andrew Joseph, Florida Keys Voters Split on Genetically Modified Mosquito Trial, STAT 
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/08/florida-keys-voters-split-on-genetically-
modified-mosquitoes/ [https://perma.cc/YBF8-JGP2]. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Marley Walker, Florida Votes to Release Millions of Zika-Fighting Mosquitos, WIRED (Nov. 
10, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/florida-votes-release-millions-zika-fighting-mosquitos/ 
[https://perma.cc/W9ZZ-TTAT]. 
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Prior to approving the field test, the FDA conducted an environmental 
assessment (“EA”) pursuant to its obligations under NEPA.142 The scope of 
the EA was limited to the potential impact of the limited field trial. A broad-
er release, or a release in different locations, may require additional EAs 
and potentially more in-depth Environmental Impact Assessments.143 
The FDA considered a series of risk-based questions to evaluate the 
potential adverse effects on humans, animals, and the environment.144 The 
EA identified forty-three endangered species in the area of the proposed 
field trial; however, it found no overlap between the identified endangered 
species and the area of the field test.145 The EA further identified two wild-
life refuge sites nearby but found that target mosquitoes were “rarely” lo-
cated in those areas.146 The FDA determined that the release of the gene-
edited mosquito would not affect the refuges or the endangered species as 
the isolated site allows for no habitat overlap among the species.147 Addi-
tionally, the FDA concluded that ingesting the altered mosquito would not 
pose a health risk to animals because the genetic modification does not cre-
ate toxins.148 
The FDA also analyzed the impacts of the mosquitoes escaping either 
en route to the field site or at the actual field site, finding only a low risk for 
human health and the environment.149 Expanding the scope of the potential 
risks, the FDA examined the effects on the environment of the United States 
as a whole.150 Again, the EA found that “release, survival, establishment, 
                                                                                                                           
 142 42 U.S.C. § 4332; FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 19. 
 143 See FDA Releases Final Environmental Assessment for Genetically Engineered Mosquito, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/newsevents/cvm
updates/ucm490246.htm [https://perma.cc/6RAB-CHA4] (stating that “FDA’s finalization of the 
EA and FONSI does not mean that Oxitec’s GE mosquitoes are approved for commercial use”). 
 144 FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 17. The questions in-
cluded: 
[T]he likelihood of inadvertent release[,] . . . the likelihood of establishment of [the 
modified] mosquitoes at the proposed trial site[,] . . . the likelihood of dispersal of 
[the] mosquitoes and their progeny from the proposed trial site[,] . . . the likelihood 
that the rDNA construct could be transferred to humans or other organisms[,] . . . the 
likelihood that release of [the modified] mosquitoes would have of adverse effects 
on non-target species at the proposed site[,] . . . the likelihood [of] adverse effects on 
humans or other animals[,] . . . [and] the likely consequences to, or effects on the 
environment of the United States . . . . 
Id. at 16−17. 
 145 Id. at 45–46, 91. 
 146 Id. at 46–48. 
 147 Id. at 48. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 75 tbl.6. 
 150 Id. at 99–103. 
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and spread” of the modified mosquito would not have adverse effects on 
either the environment, human health, or non-target animal health.151 
The FDA determined that a full environmental impact statement was 
unnecessary due to three key findings. First, approximately 95% of the 
modified mosquitoes’ offspring would perish before reproducing, thus 
providing a biological containment mechanism for the proposed trial.152 
Second, the island location provided “geophysical containment.”153 Third, 
the EA compared the field test to the risks associated with a “no action” 
alternative of continued reliance on integrated mosquito management prac-
tices involving aerial larvicide application from an airplane.154 
Oxitec has also received approval for a field test of genetically-
modified diamondback moths, insects that feed on kale, broccoli, brussels 
sprouts, and other crops, causing an estimated global loss of $5 billion an-
nually.155 The gene modification is similar to that used to develop the modi-
fied Aedes aegypti mosquito, whereby the female offspring of a genetically-
modified moth die before they are able to reproduce.156 The moth is classi-
fied as a “pest” under the PPA and therefore subject to USDA jurisdic-
tion.157 The moth does not fall within the jurisdiction of the FDA or EPA 
because it does not yield food for human or livestock consumption and does 
not contain plant-incorporated protectants or require the use of other pesti-
cides that are not already in use for other non-gene-edited moths.158 The 
modified moth could potentially fall within the FDA’s proposed guidance 
regarding genetically-engineered animals.159 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Id. at 103. 
 152 Id. at 17−18. 
 153 Id. at 17. 
 154 Id. at 20–21. Even with additional unpredictable adulticide methods, the effectiveness rate 
of controlling the specific disease carrying mosquito is only around 50% not including the mos-
quitoes developing a potential resistance. Id. 
 155 DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE FIELD RELEASE OF GENETICALLY-
ENGINEERED DIAMONDBACK MOTH IN NEW YORK: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1, 10, 62 (Dec. 
2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/16_076101r_pea.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW2F-
BGH3] [hereinafter DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. The field trial took 
place on a ten-acre plot of the Cornell University New York State Agricultural Experiment Station 
in Geneva, New York, and lasted approximately one month. Id. at 1, 59. 
 156 Availability of a Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 
for the Field Release of Genetically-Engineered Diamondback Moths, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,548, 
31,548 (July 7, 2017). 
 157 DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 155, at 2−3, 6−8. 
 158 Id. at 7–8. 
 159 See FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6–8 (noting that the FDA has 
authority over “new animal drugs” defined in the FDCA as “articles intended for use in the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals,” and “articles 
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the boy of man or other ani-
mals”). 
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The USDA completed an EA that compared the current strategy of 
controlling moth populations via pesticides to risks associated with the pro-
posed field trial of the genetically-modified moth.160 The EA revealed no 
cumulative environmental impacts resulting from approval of the field re-
lease and concluded that the field release would not impact threatened or 
endangered species.161 On the contrary, the USDA determined that approv-
ing the genetically-modified moth may lead to environmental benefits by 
reducing the amount of insecticides applied during the growing season.162 
Harm to species that prey on the moths was unlikely because the moth pop-
ulation would otherwise be controlled with pesticides and the preying spe-
cies consume other insects.163 Additionally, the introduced traits were not 
likely allergenic or toxic to those consuming the genetically-modified 
moths.164 The USDA identified the potential risk of DNA transfer from the 
gene-edited moths to individual soil microflora, but concluded the transfer 
was unlikely.165 Overall, the EA revealed that permitting the field trial simp-
ly continues the approaches already in place in the agroecosystem limiting 
biodiversity and thus concluded that the impact of the field trial on the 
physical environment (including soil, water, air quality, and climate change) 
was comparable to impacts of conventional pesticide use via the no action 
alternative.166 
The EA also assessed the current health hazards to both the general 
public and farmworkers.167 The USDA distinguished between the two 
groups because the proximity of the farmworkers to the moth raises their 
exposure risks compared to the general public, including risks associated 
with conventional pesticides as well as any risks associated with the genet-
ically-modified moths.168 For example, there is a potential risk that farm-
workers may develop allergic responses as a result of the moths’ hair and 
scales.169 The USDA found little variance from current exposure to non-
gene-edited moths, however.170 Unlike the proposed Key Haven mosquito 
                                                                                                                           
 160 DIAMONDBACK MOTH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 155, at 1–6. 
 161 Id. at 62. 
 162 Id. at 58. 
 163 Id. at 57–58. 
 164 Id. at 57. 
 165 Id. at 44–45. 
 166 Id. at 32–33, 44, 58. 
 167 Id. at 59–61. 
 168 Id. at 59–60. 
 169 Id. at 61. 
 170 Id. 
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trial, there was no public referendum, although the USDA accepted public 
comments on the EA.171 
2. Limitations of NEPA 
The direct connection between natural resource management, envi-
ronmental protection, and governance of genetic engineering is irrefutable. 
Altering genomes alters organisms and, in the case of gene drives, potential-
ly the genetic makeup of future generations. The impacts may also extend 
far beyond the target organisms. Gene edits may allow some species to out-
compete others, allow them to move to new habitats and thus affect a new 
group of species, or potentially make some resources more valuable for 
human consumption and thus more subject to extraction. In the context of 
gene editing technologies that could eradicate species and permanently alter 
others, reliance on a procedural statute—NEPA—to inform decisions about 
environmental risk is insufficient.172 Although NEPA may identify the im-
portant issues, it does not offer guidance to resolve the issues or require the 
agencies considering release of gene-edited organisms to address the con-
cerns. 
The prospect of engineering extinction or de-extinction (using gene ed-
iting to recreate extinct species) via CRISPR is an acute example of the in-
terplay between natural resource statutes and gene editing that requires 
more than NEPA review. Although protection against invasive species is an 
important aspect of resource management, statutes generally aim to prevent, 
rather than facilitate, extinction.173 The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) 
and Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”) prohibit a wide range of 
activities that could harm or kill threatened or endangered species.174 The 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Id. at 8–9. 
 172 See, e.g., Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) 
(stating that “once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the 
only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences”); 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (find-
ing that NEPA is “essentially procedural”); Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National 
Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 207, 217 (1992) (stating that “[f]earing extensive judicial intervention in administrative 
decision making under NEPA, the Court began limiting the effect of the various circuit court deci-
sions that seemed to allow such intervention”). 
 173 See, e.g., Invasive Species, ILL. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., https://www.dnr.illinois.gov/
conservation/IWAP/Pages/InvasiveSpecies.aspx [https://perma.cc/9CYM-NQCQ] (stating that “[i]n-
vasive species pose one of the greatest threats to Illinois’ natural areas, native communities, and 
natural resources”). 
 174 See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361−1421h (2018) (pro-
hibiting the “taking” of marine mammals, defined as “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to 
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal”); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 
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Pelly Amendment and Packwood-Magnuson Amendment seek to enforce 
international whaling restrictions.175 Other statutes seek to restrict interna-
tional trade in threatened or endangered species and support conservation 
measures in countries of origin.176 These statutes are explicitly values-
based, dedicating tax dollars to preserve some of the world’s most vulnera-
ble species, restricting economic activity, and, in the case of the ESA, im-
plementing federal restrictions on private land use to protect habitat of cov-
ered species.177 These restrictions are not based solely on anthropocentric 
goals or on ecosystem health. The statutes aim to protect individual mem-
bers of a threatened or endangered species, and protections are based on 
scientific assessments rather than consideration of the value to humans or 
economic impacts.178 
Extinction is generally a slow process. This is a key presumption of the 
ESA, allowing government scientists time to identify potentially vulnerable 
species and complete studies assessing their status and threats to their via-
bility.179 The United States Fish & Wildlife Service must complete the pro-
                                                                                                                           
§ 1538 (2018) (prohibiting the import, export, and taking of any endangered species of fish or 
wildlife). 
 175 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (1979) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (2018)) (imposing a reduction of not less than fifty percent in 
the fishing rights of any foreign country that violates international whaling laws in U.S. waters); 
Pelly Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 1978 (2018)) (allowing the president to restrict fish imports from nations that violate interna-
tional whale conservation standards). 
 176 See, e.g., Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371−3378 (2018) (prohibiting 
interstate and international trafficking in exotic animals); African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 4203 (2018) (stating that the Act seeks to aid in the “conservation and protection of the 
African elephant by supporting the conservation programs of African countries”);Wild Bird Con-
servation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4901−4916 (2018) (restricting international trade of exotic birds and 
encouraging conservation programs in countries of origin); Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 5302 (2018) (stating the Act’s purpose is “[t]o assist in the conservation of rhi-
noceros and tigers by supporting the conservation programs of nations whose activities directly or 
indirectly affect rhinoceros and tiger populations”). 
 177 See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to Protect the 
Whole of Creation, 2 ANIMAL L. 1, 1 (1996) (discussing “the moral, ethical, and religious values 
underlying the Endangered Species Act”). 
 178 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b) (stating that the secretary determines whether a species is en-
dangered or threatened based on “scientific and commercial data”); 4211(d)(1) (providing protec-
tions for the African elephant through research, conservation and management programs, and 
development of scientific information); 5304(d)(3) (allowing projects to assist conservation efforts 
and development of scientific information for the protection of rhinoceros or tigers). 
 179 Endangered Species: Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/listing-overview.html [https://perma.cc/4XY9-Y53G]. 
The MMPA protects marine mammals by default but provides for limited exceptions. NOAA Fisher-
ies, Laws & Policies: Marine Mammal Protection Act, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa/ [https://perma.cc/CC48-FQ6W]. 
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cess and list a species as either endangered or threatened before ESA pro-
tections apply.180 
Using gene drives to prevent reproduction could foster population col-
lapses at such a rapid pace that the Fish & Wildlife Service could not com-
plete the listing process.181 Furthermore, even if regulators were able to 
complete an expedited listing process, the gene drive could still result in 
eventual extinction. A gene drive proliferating through a population would 
not trigger ESA or MMPA restrictions if there is no additional prohibited act 
to the listed species. In other words, the “harm” to the species caused by the 
gene drive could occur prior to listing, and thus fall outside the scope of the 
ESA. 
De-extinction may challenge natural resource statutes from a different 
angle, calling into question core tenets of laws and treaties aimed at protect-
ing threatened and endangered species.182 Is the goal merely existence of 
the species, or does the ability to engage in de-extinction also require habi-
tat rehabilitation?183 In the event a single member of an extinct species is 
recreated, it would be endangered by definition (but not subject to ESA pro-
tections prior to listing the species as threatened or endangered).184 Would 
reintroducing additional members of the species be necessary to ensure the 
survival of the species, or would it be acceptable to mate with existing spe-
cies, maintain the recreated organism in captivity, or release the organism in 
areas that are similar to its original habitat? The ESA and the suite of laws 
applying to genetically-engineered organisms do not contemplate these is-
sues, and at best NEPA only requires that the agencies give them due con-
sideration. 
                                                                                                                           
 180 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2018). 
 181 Charleston Noble et al., Current CRISPR Gene Drive Systems Are Likely to Be Highly Inva-
sive in Wild Populations, 7 eLife e33423 (2018), https://elifesciences.org/articles/33423 [https://
perma.cc/4RTX-2X7N] (“Our models show that although resistance prevents spread to fixation in 
large populations, even the least effective drive systems reported to date are likely to be highly 
invasive. Releasing a small number of organisms will often cause invasion of the local population, 
followed by invasion of additional populations connected by very low rates of gene flow.”). 
 182 See Gregory E. Kaebnick & Bruce Jennings, De-extinction and Conservation, 47 HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP. S2, S2 (July−Aug. 2017) (discussing the ethical considerations presented by de-
extinction). 
 183 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction, Dualisms, and 
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (2015) (noting that the placement of 
a de-extinct species into its prior habitat could have ecological benefits). 
 184 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). 
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C. Agencies’ Authority to Consider Alternatives 
Avoidance of regulatory coverage and the lack of substantive ecologi-
cal considerations are not the only gaps in biotechnology oversight present-
ed by CRISPR. In many circumstances, existing laws also limit the factors 
that government officials may consider when determining whether to ap-
prove a genetically-engineered product. Where officials do have authority to 
look beyond the product-specific risk assessment, there is a lack of policy 
guidance to inform how they should wield that authority. For example, the 
current governance framework, including the 2017 Update to the Coordi-
nated Framework, does not consider whether there are circumstances when 
a genetic modification may be safe but offer no benefit beyond those 
achievable via alternate, equally safe means.185 Gene editing may also play 
an important role in modifying species to help them adapt to the changing 
climate and related issues such as the spread of diseases.186 Releasing genet-
ically-modified organisms when equally effective alternatives exist, or 
when the gene modification is not aimed at addressing a critical health or 
environmental concern, may be another matter.187 
Opponents of the Key Haven field test pointed to the ability to achieve 
a similar result using conventional bacteria rather than genetically-
engineered organisms, suggesting opposition to genetically-modified organ-
isms rather than eradicating the species by interfering with the reproduction 
cycle.188 The FDA’s basis for approval, however, did not rest on the severe 
health impacts of the mosquito-borne diseases, the potential benefits of re-
duced pesticide use, or the fact that the Aedes aegypti mosquito is not native 
                                                                                                                           
 185 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41. 
 186 See, e.g., Chase Purdy, A Global Chocolate Crisis Looms, but Scientists Believe They Can 
Genetically Engineer a Fix, QUARTZ (Jan 3, 2018), https://qz.com/1170536/crispr-gene-edited-
cacao-plants-could-save-the-chocolate-industry-from-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/PL4Q-T3NN] 
(explaining that gene editing is helping develop cocoa plants less vulnerable to diseases resulting 
from a changing climate in areas where the plant is primarily grown). 
 187 Research suggests that public perceptions of gene editing differ depending on the specific 
applications. See, e.g., Dietram A. Scheufele et al., U.S. Attitudes on Human Genome Editing, 357 
SCI. 553, 553–54 (2017) (detailing greater public acceptance of gene editing for therapeutic pur-
poses and lower acceptance for enhancement purposes). 
 188 See Susan Milius, In Florida, They’re Fighting Mosquitoes by Meddling with Their Sex 
Lives, SCI. NEWS (May 8, 2017), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/florida-theyre-fighting-
mosquitoes-meddling-their-sex-lives [https://perma.cc/A9GS-NH2F] (describing a 2017 alternate 
field trial in Key Haven involving mosquitoes infected with existing—i.e., not genetically-
modified—Wolbachia bacteria). Notably, because the Wolbachia bacteria is not genetically-
modified, the release falls under EPA rather than FDA jurisdiction even though it, like Oxitec’s 
modified mosquito, aims to significantly reduce the Aedes aegypti population by preventing male 
mosquitoes from reproducing. News Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Grants Extension of Exper-
imental Use Permit for ‘Wolbachia Mosquito’ (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/pesticides/epa-
grants-extension-experimental-use-permit-wolbachia-mosquito [https://perma.cc/62NM-X44P]. 
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to the Florida Keys. The focus was on the safety of the trial, not the relative 
benefits of the genetically-modified mosquito in the event the trial is ulti-
mately successful.189 The Coordinated Framework does not identify circum-
stances for proper and improper release of genetically-engineered organ-
isms, provided they satisfy the lead agency’s risk-based assessment. 
The argument here is not that gene editing should not proceed if other 
options exist. Some of these potential changes undoubtedly offer societal 
benefits. It is important, however, to recognize that the legal system is not 
designed to distinguish between gene editing applications that address criti-
cal societal needs versus those that are cosmetic, duplicative of equally ef-
fective options, or address social needs but raise the prospect of harmful 
impacts beyond the scope of an agency’s current jurisdiction. 
D. Consideration of Competing Ideologies 
A fourth gap points to a more fundamental challenge for biotechnology 
governance: although the existing regulatory framework may consider near-
term anticipated risks presented by evolving gene editing technologies, it 
fails to address the broader range of societal interests and values inherent in 
the biotechnology debate.190 Value choices are embedded in every aspect of 
biotechnology governance.191 Research and risk assessments may answer a 
threshold question regarding safety, but are not dispositive on their own. 
Data suggesting the likelihood of significant harm to humans or the ecosys-
tem would create a powerful presumption against release. The reverse is not 
necessarily true. Scientific consensus regarding safety and anticipated bene-
fits of a new genetically-engineered organism may be persuasive but may 
also fail to consider additional concerns regarding the modified organism or 
the rationales for utilizing genetic modifications. 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See FDA MOSQUITO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 16–19 (providing 
overview and discussing the goals of the assessment). 
 190 This gap is not unique to the field of gene editing. See Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does 
the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
724, 727 (2009) (stating that “[e]xisting regulatory frameworks often exclude consideration of 
social and moral concerns, ruling them outside the bounds of the jurisdiction of regulatory agen-
cies or reviewing courts”). 
 191 See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that “[q]uestions about 
gene drives rest on values at every step, from whether, why, and how research should be conduct-
ed to whether and where a gene-drive modified organism should be released into the environ-
ment”); PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 14, at 69 box 
3-1 (stating that “[v]alues are always embedded in risk analysis by the choices and interpretations 
of the people conducting them and the selection of risk-assessment endpoints of concern, methods, 
and questions”); Kuzma, supra note 109, at 167 (“[I]t is impossible to be completely ‘science 
based’ in a regulatory system. Value judgements are embedded in all risk and safety assess-
ments.”). 
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The decision to prioritize development of biotechnology products 
through a product-based regulatory system is itself a value choice. The fo-
cus on risk as a primary criterion for governance is another implicit value 
choice and raises numerous follow-up questions.192 Determining who is at 
risk, what risks are considered, and what is an unacceptable risk requires 
tradeoffs.193 Furthermore, policymakers implementing the risk-based ap-
proach must decide whether to discount future risks, how much weight, if 
any, to grant to ecological risks and risks to non-human organisms, and how 
certain must a risk be to influence a regulatory decision.194 Value choices 
also arise when considering whether to draw distinctions between germline 
and somatic alterations, therapeutic versus enhancement purposes, and hu-
man versus non-human applications.195 
Defining safety and risk as the primary (or sole) criteria for evaluating 
a biotechnology application results in a one-dimensional debate. GMO ad-
vocates frequently point to the high level of market penetration of agricul-
tural GMO seeds and the lack of evidence of safety issues as an open and 
shut case regarding the value and safety of genetic engineering.196 The re-
sult is a consistent dismissal of concerns about existing GMO products and, 
by extension, advances in genetic engineering generally.197 Health concerns 
regarding genetically-modified agricultural products have proven unfound-
ed, and proponents of minimal regulatory limitations on biotechnology de-
                                                                                                                           
 192 Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards 
Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1765 
(2002). 
 193 Id. 
 194 See, e.g., David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and 
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 94 (2005) (discussing the ways that risk 
identification and framing impact risk analysis, including “by dictating how different types and 
sources of scientific uncertainty will be integrated into the risk-identification and risk-evaluation 
process”); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 103 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (stating that 
“[t]echniques that aim to simplify risk necessarily embed value choices, some of them highly 
contentious”). 
 195 See, e.g., Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS 167, 169 (2017) (differentiating between germline editing and somatic gene editing and 
both methods’ impact on CRISPR-Cas9). 
 196 See, e.g., Jon Entine, Will Biotechnology Regulations Squelch Next Food and Farming Inno-
vation?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT 1, 2 (2017) (arguing that advancements in recent genetic engi-
neering technology support changing of old, “overly-restrictive” regulations that do not account for a 
“clear consensus on [genetic engineering] safety”); Commonly Asked Questions About the Food 
Safety of GMOs, MONSANTO (Apr. 6, 2017), https://monsanto.com/company/commitments/safety/
statements/are-gmos-safe/ [https://perma.cc/88PZ-B88B] (citing the prevalence of genetically-
modified organisms and benefits associated with their use). 
 197 See Entine, supra note 196 (noting that the regulations of genetically engineered products 
are out of date and stifle innovation). 
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velopments point to these results as evidence that future gene editing of 
seeds and livestock is also likely to be safe.198 
To dismiss these concerns with a response about a product’s safety 
misses the point. The range of issues leading to concern with, or opposition 
to, genetic engineering is broad. If the debate were truly one dimensional, 
reliance on data demonstrating a lack of negative health or ecological im-
pacts caused by existing GMO products would presumably be persuasive. 
The fact that opposition continues, even among scientists involved in bio-
technology research, demonstrates that concerns extend beyond safety and 
risk.199 The debate about GMOs is as much about values as it is about sci-
ence.200 Although some opposition to GMOs is about health concerns, and 
those holding those concerns may continue to maintain their beliefs despite 
any amount of evidence to the contrary, policymakers should also under-
stand ongoing references to health concerns as rooted in a deeper set of val-
ues-based concerns. 
Stakeholder perspectives regarding biotechnology governance take 
many forms. For many scientists in the public and private sectors, there is a 
moral imperative to pursue advances in the field of genetics.201 If scientists 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPE-
RIENCES AND PROSPECTS 225 (2016) (finding that GE foods pose no higher human health risks 
than non-GE food, based upon extensive data and tests conducted); see also Enriquez, supra note 
7, at 514−15 (explaining that despite the unknowns of future biotechnology, decades of scientific 
research indicate that the health risks associated with both recombinant and non-recombinant GM 
crops are similar, and thus a strictly “risk-based approach” supports deregulation of future bio-
technology products); Alessandro Nicolia et al., An Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically 
Engineered Crop Safety Research, 34 CRITICAL REVS. IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 77, 84–85 (2013) 
(finding that research over the past ten years has yet to directly link health risk to GM crops). 
 199 GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 65 (noting “the possibility that some 
ways of using genetic technologies conflict with underlying moral norms that are implicit in how 
human beings understand the world, including their own nature and relationship to the rest of the 
world”); see Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified 
Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 743 (2003) (highlighting that the debate surrounding 
GMOs ranges from economic concerns, to health concerns, to agriculture and more).  
 200 See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 65 (stating that “[q]uestions about 
gene drives rest on values at every step, from whether, why, and how research should be conduct-
ed to whether and where a gene-drive modified organism should be released into the environ-
ment”); see also Keith Kloor, Food Evolution Is Scientifically Accurate. Too Bad It Won’t Con-
vince Anyone, SLATE (June 23, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/
2017/06/food_evolution_is_correct_on_gmos_and_unconvincing.html [https://perma.cc/L3H6-8RH9] 
(noting that individuals’ values or beliefs regarding GMOs often outweigh scientific evidence of 
GMO safety). 
 201 See Kuzma, supra note 109, at 166 (quoting plant scientist Ingo Potrykus stating that “it 
would be a ‘crime against humanity’ not to change from ‘regulating a technology on ideological 
terms’ to ‘science-based regulation, guided by considerations of the risks and benefits of the 
trait’”); see also George Church, Encourage the Innovators, 528 NATURE S7, S7 (2015) (“[T]he 
concept of a ban on germline editing does not make sense. . . . Banning human-germline editing 
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have the ability to address severe health problems, it becomes a moral 
choice whether to do so.202 These biotechnology proponents argue that re-
strictions on gene editing research could deny society numerous promising 
benefits: elimination of vector-borne diseases such as the Zika virus and 
malaria, diseases such as sickle cell anemia and cystic fibrosis caused by 
genetic defects, and potentially a range of other lethal and debilitating vi-
ruses and diseases, including HIV.203 Increased food production and de-
creased use of pesticides are other commonly cited benefits.204 Some oppo-
nents of restrictions on gene editing and other biotechnologies also point to 
the competitive disadvantages if the United States maintains its ban on hu-
man hereditary modifications even though other countries permit it.205 The 
moral imperative ideology is not solely about human health benefits. Re-
strictions on gene editing could also prevent developments that could help 
conserve threatened and endangered species by inserting traits that make 
them more resilient to changing environmental conditions or potentially 
bringing species back from extinction.206 
                                                                                                                           
could put a damper on the best medical research and instead drive the practice underground to 
black markets and uncontrolled medical tourism . . . .”); Julian Savulescu et al., The Moral Imper-
ative to Continue Gene Editing Research on Human Embryos, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 476, 476 (2015) 
(stating that “[t]o intentionally refrain from engaging in life-saving research is to be morally re-
sponsible for the foreseeable, avoidable deaths of those who could have benefitted”) (citing PETER 
SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 208–09, 226–28 (2d ed. 1993)); William J. Clinton, President of the 
United States, Remarks on Presenting the National Medals of Science and Technology (Mar. 14, 
2000) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58246 [https://
perma.cc/RE6L-CYDS]) (“Perhaps no science today is more compelling than the effort to deci-
pher the human genome, a string of three billion letters that make up our genes . . . . This will be 
the scientific breakthrough of the century, perhaps of all time”). 
 202 Kevin M. Esvelt, The Morality of Nature, SCULPTING NATURE, http://www.sculpting
evolution.org/blog/themoralityofnature [https://perma.cc/6686-Y58Q]. 
 203 Marcy E. Gallo & John F. Sargent, Jr., CRISPR: A Revolutionary Tool for Editing the 
Code of Life?, CONG. RES. SERV. INSIGHT 1, 2 (2016); see Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 25, 
at 1077 (stating that “[CRISPR’s] application in genome-wide studies will enable large-scale 
screening for drug targets and other phenotypes and will facilitate the generation of engineered 
animal models that will benefit pharmacological studies and the understanding of human diseas-
es”). 
 204 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Mod-
ified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 408−15 (2002) (discussing “potential benefits of ge-
netically modified foods”). 
 205 See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, The FDA Is Prohibited from Going Germline, 
353 SCI. 545, 545−46 (2016) (noting the ban includes prohibitions on genetic modifications that 
could prevent “rare incurable Mendelian disorders . . .[,] secure ‘savior siblings’ through editing of 
the genome of a human embryo when in vitro fertilization fails to secure tissue-matched embryos 
for intrauterine transfer[, and] mitochondrial DNA diseases by mitochondrial replacement”). 
 206 GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 5–6. Efforts to reverse extinction could 
prove ineffective unless the underlying causes of the extinction, such as habitat loss, are also ad-
dressed. Id. at 37–38; see Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species 
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Ongoing advocacy for risk-based governance presents a second view-
point: faith in expert management to identify, evaluate, and manage risks 
associated with the rapidly developing field of genetic engineering.207 Sci-
ence-based risk governance is a dominant theme for emerging technologies 
generally, as it provides a pathway to allow continued technological devel-
opment even when risks are unknown and potentially catastrophic.208 Pro-
ponents of expert risk management recognize that there may be potential 
downsides to a technology, but generally have faith that the risks are man-
ageable if the proper oversight mechanisms are in place. Trust the experts, 
these proponents argue, as they understand the technology and have the 
means to control its impacts.209 Although there is general support for risk-
based governance, viewpoints regarding the proper application of risk man-
agement are not uniform. There is an ongoing debate among scientists and 
other experts regarding the appropriate level of risk tolerance and the role of 
the precautionary principle.210 These debates are important and may impact 
future governance choices, but they generally accept risk-based governance 
as the appropriate starting point. 
The first two viewpoints drive the dominant approach under U.S. law 
and are reflected in the prioritization of risk management in recent reports 
on gene editing by the National Academies.211 As discussed in Part II, the 
original 1986 Coordinated Framework and the 2017 Update to the Coordi-
nated Framework conclude that continued advances in biotechnology are 
desirable, that genetic engineering processes are not inherently risky, and 
that it is possible to manage risks presented by specific genetically-
engineered products using the same regulatory mechanisms that apply to 
conventional products.212 
                                                                                                                           
Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 233 
(1998) (identifying habitat loss as the primary factor driving mass extinction). 
 207 This viewpoint is similar to the reliance on technocratic federal resource managers that 
emerged in the early 1900s. Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Envi-
ronmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 173−74, 208 (2012). 
 208 See Kuzma, supra note 109, at 166 (describing the United States’ risk-based regulation of 
genetically-engineered products and processes). 
 209 See, e.g., Webber et al., supra note 45, at 10,565 (stating that “[r]esearchers, policymakers, 
and resource managers must carefully weigh the risks of implementation that could threaten rather 
than assist a given ecosystem”). 
 210 Kaebnick et al., supra note 9, at 710. 
 211 See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 22, 117–18 (listing numerous fac-
tors to consider in an ecological risk assessment of gene edited products); HUMAN GENOME EDIT-
ING, supra note 26, at 59 (listing factors such as promoting well-being, responsible science, re-
spect for persons, and fairness as key components of gene editing oversight). 
 212 See 2017 Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 41, at 1 (explaining that the Co-
ordinated Framework “effectively protects health and the environment,” and the update serves to 
prevent unnecessary barriers to developments in biotechnology innovation); see also 1986 Coor-
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Other perspectives in the gene editing debate extend beyond disagree-
ments regarding scientific expertise and risk management.213 Ecological 
concerns, for example, frequently arise in the biotechnology context.214 One 
category of ecological concerns represent a subset of risk-based govern-
ance, focusing on concerns regarding impacts on other species, uncertain 
environmental impacts, and irreversible, and potentially unintended, ecolog-
ical changes.215 Other ecological concerns extend beyond risk and merge 
into a form of romanticism.216 Some opponents to genetically-modified or-
ganisms evoke arguments similar to those used to promote wilderness 
preservation—an appeal for sacred space unaltered (at least by deliberate 
means) by humans.217 Not only could gene editing alter the ecological bal-
ance, but it could also fundamentally alter humans’ relationship with nature 
                                                                                                                           
dinated Framework, supra note 48, at 23,303 (explaining that a working committee found that 
current laws adequately addressed both traditional and new biotechnology techniques). 
 213 See, e.g., JOHN H. EVANS, PLAYING GOD?: HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC BIOETHICAL DEBATE 11−44 (2002) (analyzing how scientific ex-
pertise came to dominate the debate regarding human genetic engineering); Celia Deane-
Drummond et al., Genetically Modified Theology: The Religious Dimensions of Public Concerns 
About Agricultural Biotechnology, 14 STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 23, 23 (2001) (arguing that 
opposition to GMOs is better understood “at the level of ontology and theology rather than simply 
as concerns about physical risk and health”); Jennifer Kuzma & John C. Besley, Ethics of Risk 
Analysis and Regulatory Review: From Bio- to Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 149, 159 (2008) 
(noting that principles such as “integrity, justice, non-maleficence, and autonomy” affect public 
perceptions of a new technology and “cannot be separated from beneficence, and risk analyses, 
and regulatory review”). 
 214 As with many other issues, there is wide divergence among environmental groups regard-
ing biotechnology. See, e.g., Advocacy Groups Call for Halt to Open Air Field Trials of Genet-
ically Engineered Moths, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.centerforfood
safety.org/press-releases/4118/advocacy-groups-call-for-halt-to-open-air-field-trials-of-genetically-
engineered-moths# [https://perma.cc/G8ZP-F5EB] (describing advocacy groups’ attempts to pre-
vent the genetically-engineered moth trials and release due to safety concerns); Our Position on 
Biotechnology, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/our-position-biotechnology [https://
perma.cc/26F2-TBJV] (stating that the organization “will support or oppose specific biotechnolo-
gy products or processes based on transparent assessments of their health, environmental, social, 
and economic risks and benefits”); News Release, Friends of the Earth, USDA Proposal for Bio-
tech Regulations Falls Short (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.foe.org/news/news-releases/2017-01-
usda-proposal-for-biotech-regulations-falls-short [https://perma.cc/A7DK-RBZB] (stating that 
“consumers don’t want a bunch of new unregulated GMO foods secretly flooding onto the market. 
All GMOs—including those made with CRISPR, synthetic biology or other new genetic engineer-
ing techniques—must be regulated, safety assessed and labeled so that consumers can choose for 
themselves what they are eating and feeding their families”). 
 215 See GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 37 (discussing potential impacts on 
non-target species); Angelo, supra note 40, at 103 (noting the environmental and ecological risks 
posed by genetically-modified organisms). 
 216 Purdy, supra note 207, at 211. 
 217 See MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 40, 43–44 (1823) 
(detailing the scientist’s turmoil in creating a “life”); Enriquez, supra note 7, at 438–39 (noting 
gene editing opponents view that the process is “unnatural” and “wrong”). 
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by eroding societal norms regarding the use of technology to alter species 
and ecosystems.218 
Other stakeholders express a general discomfort with “playing God” 
through genetic engineering.219 This viewpoint arises most commonly in the 
context of direct human applications.220 Limitations on human embryo edit-
ing are partly justified under a risk-based ideology—there is too much we 
do not know and too much harm could occur, especially in the context of 
germline edits that may persist through future generations.221 The existing 
ban on federal funding for human embryo editing, and recommendations for 
stricter oversight for human embryo editing in the event it is allowed, 
                                                                                                                           
 218 Charo & Greely, supra note 29, at 15; see Heidi Ledford, The Landscape for Human Ge-
nome Editing: A View of International Regulations Suggests Where in the World a CRISPR Baby 
Could Be Born, 526 NATURE 310, 310 (2015) (“Fears loom that if genome editing becomes ac-
ceptable in the clinic to stave off disease, it will inevitably come to be used to introduce, enhance 
or eliminate traits for non-medical reasons.”). Nature is not a discreet, static, or easily identified 
state. See William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND, RETHINK-
ING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 23, 34−52 (William Cronon ed. 1995) (describing the diffi-
culty society has faced over time in defining and understanding nature). References to nature and 
wilderness do, however, suggest that they are areas beyond the realm of human development. For 
example, the Wilderness Act, states that: 
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settle-
ment and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the 
United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and 
protection in their natural condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the 
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. 
16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2018). 
 219 See, e.g., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 64–65 (identifying and dis-
cussing moral concerns surrounding genetic engineering and referencing Splicing Life: The Social 
and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings, a “seminal report” issued by the 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research in 1982); Johnjoe McFadden, Genetic Editing Is Like Playing God—And 
What’s Wrong with That?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2016/feb/02/genetic-editing-playing-god-children-british-scientists-embryos-dna-diseases [https://
perma.cc/XMS9-BXY9] (“The opponents are right. We are indeed playing God with our genes. 
But it is a good thing because God, nature or whatever we want to call the agencies that have 
made us, often get it wrong and it’s up to us to correct those mistakes.”). 
 220 Gene Editing: A CBC Interview of Margaret Somerville and Julian Savulescu, PRACTICAL 
ETHICS (Dec. 7, 2015), http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/12/gene-editing-a-cbc-interview-
of-margaret-somerville-and-julian-savulescu/ [https://perma.cc/99M6-V7VC] (noting that until 
2015 “there was almost universal agreement . . . that humans have a right to come into existence 
with their own unique genetic heritage and other humans have no right to alter them, to design 
them”). 
 221 See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Human Genome Editing: An Evolving Regulatory Climate, 57 
JURIMETRICS J. 301, 315−18 (2017) (discussing arguments for banning human germline editing); 
Collins, supra note 64 (noting “serious and unquantifiable safety issues, ethical issues presented 
by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their consent, and a cur-
rent lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in embryos”). 
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demonstrate that editing the germline of a human embryo raises concerns 
that extend beyond risk management.222 
Concerns regarding human rights, environmental justice, distributional 
impacts, intergeneration equity, consumer choice, and animal rights reflect 
additional perspectives regarding biotechnology governance.223 Those who 
may not advocate for a ban on GMOs but still call for labeling represent an 
additional perspective in the biotechnology debate—consumer choice. La-
beling and other transparency measures allow stakeholders to use purchas-
ing power to determine whether to support an approach to agriculture or 
medicine, to reject uses that are counter to their understandings of the prop-
er role of humans in the ecosystem, to support smaller industry players who 
may not have the resources to license an emerging technology or navigate 
the regulatory system, or simply to avoid products that they consider dis-
tasteful.224 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See, e.g., HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 5−6 (advocating limiting human 
trials to only “to the most compelling circumstances, [to] subject [them] to a comprehensive over-
sight framework that would protect the research subjects and their descendants, and [to institute] 
sufficient safeguards . . . to protect against inappropriate expansion to uses that are less compelling 
or less well understood”); Collins, supra note 64 (referring to “strong arguments against engaging 
in [human germline editing] . . . includ[ing] the serious and unquantifiable safety issues, ethical 
issues presented by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their 
consent, and a current lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 
in embryos”). 
 223 See, e.g., MICHAEL BESS, OUR GRANDCHILDREN REDESIGNED: LIFE IN THE BIOENGI-
NEERED SOCIETY OF THE NEAR FUTURE 87–89 (2015) (identifying unequal access to genetic 
enhancements as potentially creating a new, permanent type of caste system); BERNARD E. 
ROLLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDROME: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE GENETIC ENGI-
NEERING OF ANIMALS 18–21 (1995) (stating that science and genetic engineering inherently re-
quire value judgments); Kuzma & Rawls, supra note 40, at 281 (“Humanity’s ability to alter 
populations within ecosystems through genetic engineering raises issues associated with biodiver-
sity and conservation that, in turn, may affect the abilities of current and future generations to use 
and enjoy the benefits of the natural world.”); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial 
Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 458–59 (2016) (stating that 
“[m]any policymakers and activist organizations argue that consumers have a right to know 
whether food products contain, or were manufactured with, ingredients that were produced with 
these modern genetic engineering techniques”); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 604–05 (2007) (describing the “environmental justice” perspec-
tive that the import of genetically-modified products into developing countries risks an increase in 
socioeconomic inequality); UNESCO, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN GENOME AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS art. 11 (1997) (calling for a ban on “[p]ractices which are contrary to human 
dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings” and calling for international cooperation 
“to ensure that the principles set out in this Declaration are respected”). 
 224 Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, with Special Reference to Genetically Modified 
Foods, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1077 (2017) (citing Sydney E. Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute 
Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United States, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 
316, 317 (2016)); see Peck, supra note 40, at 316 (noting complaints by “small private and public 
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The perspectives described above are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive of one another. A stakeholder may hold numerous viewpoints at once, 
such as a general apprehension about decentralized decision making regard-
ing the use of gene drives, appreciation that certain genetic engineering ap-
plications may foster greater environmental benefits, and a belief that scien-
tists should continue to pursue gene therapies to address severe genetic dis-
orders, provided appropriate ethical and risk management protections are in 
place. The key takeaway for biotechnology governance is not that policy 
should prioritize one viewpoint over others, but rather that the current de-
bate reflects these competing viewpoints and that existing regulatory 
schemes offer models for accommodating multiple perspectives. 
IV. INCORPORATING A NATURAL RESOURCES FRAMEWORK INTO 
BIOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE 
The scientific advances allowing gene editing are new, but the chal-
lenges with balancing competing considerations regarding the use and alter-
ation of natural resources are not.225 Focusing on threshold questions re-
garding values, irreversibility, and the public good, the debate over gene 
editing governance reflects longstanding debates over natural resource 
management. The nation’s strategies for balancing conservation, preserva-
tion, and numerous other uses of federal lands, wildlife, plants, water, and 
minerals have dealt with similar issues for well over a century.226 Gene edit-
ing adds a new, albeit complex, dimension to these existing debates by ex-
panding the tools available to alter public and private resources. 
Natural resource management offers a new conceptual model for bio-
technology governance that moves beyond a risk-based, case by case ap-
proach. Incorporating a natural resource management perspective into bio-
technology governance would provide a frame of reference for considering 
gene editing and its implications through the lens of public and private re-
                                                                                                                           
laboratories” that the current biotechnology regulatory system “is so difficult to navigate that 
many are discouraged from pursuing biotechnology research”); Jacob S. Sherkow, How Much Is a 
CRISPR Patent License Worth?, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacob
sherkow/2017/02/21/how-much-is-a-crispr-patent-license-worth/#7fe3b6e56b77 [https://perma.cc/
7YBX-ZBCW] (analyzing the likely value of an exclusive CRISPR patent). 
 225 Purdy, supra note 207, at 186−89; see RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE 
AMERICAN MIND 23–43 (4th ed. 2001) (detailing the efforts by early American settlers to use 
natural resources and hold dominion over the land rather than preserve its natural state). 
 226 See Purdy, supra note 207, at 199–203 (noting the rise of the Sierra Club in 1892 and its 
publication of material describing natural landscapes). United States laws addressing natural re-
source management are as old as the country itself, but the contemporary conflicts regarding use, 
conservation, and preservation emerged in the late 1800s as the federal government shifted away 
from its previous policy of transferring federal lands to the states. Id. at 199–200, 205–06. 
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sources for which there are conflicting perspectives regarding appropriate 
uses and preservation. Although existing laws do not contemplate the ability 
to reorder ecosystems via gene editing, there is an established regulatory 
system designed to address risks of extinction, accommodate competing 
ideologies regarding resource use, and incorporate interests of future gener-
ations when considering irreversible decisions regarding natural re-
sources—all issues that are implicated by gene editing.227 
Federal lands policies, for example, have evolved to manage conflict-
ing interests and values, identifying appropriate uses and allocating re-
sources.228 As Professor Jedediah Purdy notes, federal resource policies 
now reflect a combination of ideologies that emerged at different times in 
U.S. history.229 Together, these policies simultaneously view the public 
good as utilizing resources to promote the country’s economic growth, rely 
on technocratic management to balance competing resource uses, prioritize 
conservation, recreation, and preservation of the nation’s lands, and recog-
nize the complex interactions necessary to maintain a healthy ecosystem.230 
At times, natural resource statutes include precommitments to refrain 
from certain uses due to the characteristics of the resource(for example, na-
tional monuments and national parks), concerns regarding irreversible im-
pacts (for example, protecting endangered species), or prioritizing nonuse 
values over other potential uses (for example, wilderness areas). National 
Wilderness Areas, National Parks, National Forests, National Monuments, 
and National Recreation Areas each have distinct statutory and regulatory 
criteria for designation, access, and resource use based on the characteristics 
                                                                                                                           
 227 See, e.g., Amy Joi O’Donoghue, State Wildlife Board Opposes Bears Ears Monument in 
Letter to Feds, KSL.COM (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ksl.com/?sid=41096372&nid=148 [https://
perma.cc/7NR2-99HZ] (discussing opposition to the Bears Ears National Monument due to the 
“area’s importance to wildlife and wildlife-based recreation”). Designated wilderness areas, na-
tional monuments, and national wildlife refuges each represent a precommitment to restrict re-
source extraction despite the potential for local and state economic benefits from other uses. Id. 
 228 See, e.g., JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 45 (3d ed. 
2016) (stating that “competition over scarce natural resources inevitably causes a clash of compet-
ing interests”); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 140, 144 (1999) (noting the tension between preservation and recreation); Jan G. Laitos 
& Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 505 (2008) 
(describing the rise of recreation and conservation goals, and the conflicts among these uses and 
different uses of undeveloped lands); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in 
the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 436 (2010) (stating that “natural resource law is as much the 
management of conflict as it is the management of public lands, waters, or species”); Walter 
Rusinek, Balancing Competing Interests: A Natural Resources Law Primer, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 
1995, at 24–29 (describing the tension and balance in natural resources law between use and 
preservation of natural resources). 
 229 Purdy, supra note 207, at 173−74. 
 230 See id. at 173–74, 208 (detailing the impacts of federal resource policies). 
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of the lands and resources contained therein.231 For example, the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 instructs the Bureau of Land 
Management to balance “recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, 
wildlife and fish resources” as well as “natural scenic, scientific and histori-
cal values.”232 The management practices must ensure “sustained yield” and 
protect current and future use.233 The Organic Act of 1916 requires the Park 
Service to achieve the conflicting goals of conserving “the scenery, natural 
and historic objects, and wild life” while also allowing for recreation, and 
leaving the resources “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions.”234 In other circumstances, Congress specifies how to resolve com-
peting uses at the outset, such as the Wilderness Act prohibiting commercial 
enterprises, permanent roads, motorized vehicles, and manmade structures, 
while permitting continued livestock grazing.235 
Federal land management also generally requires consideration of eco-
logical impacts. In some instances, these considerations take the form of 
balancing ecological impacts with other statutory goals, such as multiple 
use.236 In other instances, ecological considerations take priority. Specifying 
the relative importance of ecological impacts provides important guidance 
to regulators and, similar to requirements to consider the interests of future 
generations, outlines substantive requirements that may be subject to judi-
cial review. These requirements operate in conjunction with NEPA’s proce-
dural mandate to evaluate actions that may have significant environmental 
impacts.237 
Strategies for resolving natural resource conflicts are far from perfect. 
Intense disputes persist regarding species preservation, land preservation, 
and access to resources.238 Taken as a whole, however, the system of natural 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 1131 (2018)); Organic Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as 
amended at 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2018)); National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2018)); Antiquities Act, 
Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2018)). This is 
far from a complete list. Federal agencies may have multiple land classifications under their juris-
diction. See, e.g., Garett R. Rose, “Reservations of Like Character”—The Origins and Benefits of 
the National Park System’s Classification Hierarchy, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 355, 362–71 (2016) 
(identifying land classifications under National Park Service jurisdiction). 
 232 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018). 
 233 Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1702(h). 
 234 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2018). 
 235 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(c), (d)(4). 
 236 See, e.g., id. § 1611(a) (“[A]ny such planned departure must be consistent with the multi-
ple-use management objectives of the land management plan”). 
 237 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2018). 
 238 See, e.g., Kirk Siegler, With National Monuments Under Review, Bears Ears Is Focus of 
Fierce Debate, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/05/526860725/
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resource governance requires consideration of the tradeoffs associated with 
altering natural systems and balancing competing values. The range of natu-
ral resource statutes thus provides models for considering categories of gene 
editing applications in terms of their economic, ecological, and cultural im-
pacts, including risks, benefits, and values-based considerations that extend 
beyond the risk-benefit framework. 
Explicitly incorporating additional criteria to biotechnology govern-
ance would allow policy discussions to move beyond the product versus 
process focus. Instead, the focus would shift from product to potential for 
natural resource impacts. This change would allow a multifaceted regulato-
ry approach that is better prepared to consider the range of complex ecolog-
ical and distributional impacts that will likely arise due to gene editing. 
Considering the values implicated by the prospect of altering organisms or 
eradicating species properly situates concerns about safety and risk within 
the broader context of ideologies underlying the biotechnology debate. 
Few may question the benefits of eradicating a non-native species of 
mosquito to prevent spreading the Zika virus, a virus that can cause severe 
birth defects, including microcephaly, when passed from pregnant women 
to embryos, or dengue fever, “a leading cause of illness and death in the 
tropics and subtropics” for which there is no vaccine to prevent infection, if 
the eradication method does not harm humans or the environment.239 That 
acceptance may not extend to other uses that do not address such pressing 
health concerns. 
Requiring government officials to consider additional criteria would 
likely face opposition. Such a shift would incorporate the narrative of engi-
neering evolution and extinction as a starting point, potentially leading to 
more stringent regulatory oversight in some circumstances. Proponents of 
minimal oversight of gene-edited organisms may worry that such a shift 
would result in unnecessary regulation and permitting delays, thus stifling 
innovation, restricting competitiveness of U.S. biotechnology firms, and 
delaying or denying benefits to society. 
                                                                                                                           
with-national-monuments-under-review-bears-ears-is-focus-of-fierce-debate [https://perma.cc/4SLV-
QE6K] (describing tension over the designation of monuments and use of federal lands in Utah); 
see also Jan G. Laitos, The Multiple to Dominant Use Paradigm Shift in Natural Resources Man-
agement, 24 J. LAND, RES., & ENVTL. L. 221, 227 (2004) (analyzing conflicts among recreational 
users of federal lands). 
 239 Dengue, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/dengue/
index.html [https://perma.cc/VXS7-E4Z5]. The Aedes aegypti mosquito, the mosquito strain tar-
geted in the proposed Key Haven trial, is “the most important transmitter or vector of dengue 
viruses” in the Western Hemisphere. Dengue: Frequently Asked Questions: What Is Dengue?, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/dengue/faqfacts/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/TT72-GVXF]; Questions About Zika, supra note 3. 
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Broad-based opposition to the notion of additional regulatory oversight 
is misplaced. First, delays and restrictions are an acceptable outcome if they 
result in a more effective regulatory approach for an emerging technology 
that could simultaneously offer dramatic benefits and risks. Furthermore, 
requiring federal agencies to consider criteria like the interests of future 
generations does not mandate a uniform approach for all gene editing appli-
cations nor a particular outcome. It is possible, for example, to realize 
health benefits of gene therapies, eradicate certain disease-carrying insects, 
and allow the sale of certain ecologically benign agricultural products with-
out accepting a laissez-faire approach to gene editing. It is also possible to 
maintain different restrictions for research and deployment phases of gene 
editing, and to implement an adaptive approach to resource decisions that 
allows regulatory limits to shift as new information becomes available.240 
Where timeliness is crucial, such as preventing the rapid spread of a highly 
contagious disease, regulations could allow for expedited review or provide 
exemptions. As it stands, the limited regulatory inquiries required by exist-
ing law foreclose many of these considerations. 
This section identifies three general strategies that may serve as a start-
ing point for amending biotechnology governance to incorporate lessons of 
effective natural resource management: balancing competing values; provid-
ing mechanisms for participatory governance; and implementing conserva-
tion strategies. Taken together or individually, these measures provide a 
foundation for a more robust regulatory scheme to address the fundamental 
questions presented by rapid advancements in biotechnology. Federal agen-
cies could implement some of the ideas presented in this section via admin-
istrative action. The FDA proposal to expand the definition of animal drug 
demonstrates that interpretation of statutory language may change as tech-
nologies evolve.241 Agencies could also increase opportunities for public en-
gagement under current statutory authority. Other ideas described below 
would require legislative action, such as explicitly incorporating impacts on 
future generations as part of an approval process or distinguishing between 
gene editing that addresses acute health concerns versus those that offer 
benefits of convenience or aesthetics. The discussion introduces options to 
facilitate a broader approach to biotechnology governance but does not go 
into detail regarding implementation. 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 228, at 436−43 (detailing adaptive management practic-
es for natural resources). 
 241 See FDA GE ANIMALS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 6–7 (noting each specific 
DNA or genomic alteration is a “new animal drug” subject to regulation). 
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A. Explicit Identification of Values-Based Considerations 
As the natural resource statutes described above demonstrate, Con-
gress can define, and federal agencies can address, broad, values-based lan-
guage that recognizes multiple interests involved in decisions regarding re-
source management. The statutes may grant wide discretion to agencies 
making resource decisions.242 Specifying governance criteria in a statute, 
even if by broad language, however, requires agencies to give them due 
consideration and explain their rationales.243 In the process, the specified 
criteria may also incorporate, and potentially solidify, cultural norms.244 
The debate over human genome alterations is the most prevalent ex-
ample of explicit values-based limitations on gene editing and other bio-
technology applications. 245 Gene therapies for medical purposes, including 
those utilizing gene editing techniques, face a higher level of regulatory 
scrutiny by the FDA than genetic alterations applied to animals, plants, and 
insects. Gene therapies are also subject to oversight by the National Institute 
of Health’s Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee ( “RAC”), institutional 
review boards, and biosafety committees.246 A 1996 budget amendment, 
referred to as the Dickey-Wicker amendment, prohibits federal funding for 
research on human embryos or for research that results in the destruction of 
human embryos.247 National Institute of Health Guidelines prohibit the 
RAC from “entertain[ing] proposals for germ line alteration[].”248 The RAC 
                                                                                                                           
 242 See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir. 2000) (interpreting 
the phrase “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” in the Organic Act). 
 243 See id. at 829 (remanding to determine whether the National Park Service’s interpretation 
of “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” was reasonable). 
 244 See John D. Leshy, Legal Wilderness: Its Past and Some Speculations on Its Future, 44 
ENVTL. L. 549, 551, 622 (2014) (noting the symbiotic relationship between legal and cultural 
perceptions of natural resource preservation). 
 245 See Collins, supra note 64 (explaining “[t]he concept of altering the human germline in 
embryos for clinical purposes has been debated over many years from many different perspec-
tives, and has been viewed almost universally as a line that should not be crossed” and discussing 
arguments against human genome editing, including “the serious and unquantifiable safety issues, 
ethical issues presented by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without 
their consent, and a current lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/
Cas9 in embryos”); see also GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12, at 60 (stating that 
“[t]he most prominent moral questions about genetic engineering have always been about its pro-
spective benefits and harms to human beings”). 
 246 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW OF CLINICAL GENE 
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE 77 (2014). 
 247 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996). 
 248 NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT 
ON SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES 100 (Apr. 2016), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/NIH_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGC2-URYL]. 
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reviews and monitors protocols for experimental gene therapy clinical trials 
and provides a venue for public comment and review.249 Other gene therapy 
oversight bodies do not involve the general public. 
Like other areas of biotechnology, gene therapy research is advancing 
quickly. The FDA approved a gene therapy for the first time in August 
2017.250 An FDA advisory committee recommended approval of a second 
gene therapy one month later.251 The National Institute of Health prohibits 
federal funding for human germline modifications, but the use of CRISPR 
for non-inheritable treatments is underway.252 The RAC recently approved a 
protocol for the first clinical trial of a CRISPR gene therapy in humans.253 
The trial, involving CRISPR edits of human T-cells, is privately funded and 
not aimed at germline modifications.254 In August 2017, another group of 
scientists announced the successful editing of a human embryos to address a 
genetic blood disorder—the first successful human germline editing involv-
ing U.S. scientists.255 
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine have re-
sponded to these rapid developments with numerous reports on genetic en-
gineering, including a 2017 report focused directly on human germline edit-
ing.256 The report concludes that if human germline editing were to occur, 
“it would be essential to limit these trials only to the most compelling cir-
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 256 See generally NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED OR-
GANISMS, WILDLIFE, AND HABITAT: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2008); NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL 
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GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON, supra note 12; GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED CROPS, supra note 
198; GM PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, supra note 50. 
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cumstances, to subject them to a comprehensive oversight framework that 
would protect the research subjects and their descendants, and to institute 
safeguards against inappropriate expansion into uses that are less compel-
ling or well understood.”257 The National Academies’ proposed regulatory 
framework includes the following elements: 
(i) absence of reasonable alternatives; (ii) restriction to preventing 
a serious disease or condition; (iii) restriction to editing genes that 
have been convincingly demonstrated to cause or to strongly pre-
dispose to the disease or condition; (iv) restriction to converting 
such genes to versions that are prevalent in the population and are 
known to be associated with ordinary health with little or no evi-
dence of adverse effects; availability of credible pre-clinical 
and/or clinical data on risks and potential health benefits of the 
procedures; (v) ongoing, rigorous oversight during clinical trials 
of the effects of the procedure on the health and safety of the re-
search participants; (vi) comprehensive plans for long-term, mul-
tigenerational follow-up that still respect personal autonomy; (vii) 
maximum transparency consistent with patient privacy; (viii) con-
tinued reassessment of both health and societal benefits and risks, 
with broad ongoing participation and input by the public; and (ix) 
reliable oversight mechanisms to prevent extension to uses other 
than preventing a serious disease or condition.258  
The report recognizes that these criteria are open for interpretation.259 The 
authors also note the difficulty inherent in defining concepts such as “en-
hancement,” “reasonable alternative,” and “serious disease condition.”260 
The same suggested criteria for strict oversight of human germline ed-
iting could apply to non-human gene editing applications currently under-
way. This is not to suggest that concerns regarding human and non-human 
genetic modifications are on par with one another. Implementation may dif-
fer depending on the human or non-human uses, but the National Acade-
mies’ recommendations for allowing human gene editing while addressing 
moral and ethical concerns are applicable in both contexts. For example, 
                                                                                                                           
 257 HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 7. 
 258 Id. at 7−8. 
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biotechnology policy could limit the use of gene editing to purposes where 
there is a convincing public benefit. Laws could require credible data on the 
risks and potential benefits of releasing genetically-modified organisms. 
Approval could be coupled with requirements to engage in ongoing, rigor-
ous oversight of the modified organisms and their ecosystem impacts. Re-
lease could also be conditioned on the availability of effective safeguards to 
prevent unanticipated impacts.261 Regulators could require comprehensive 
plans for long-term studies in a manner accessible to government agencies 
and the general public. Companies releasing genetically-modified organ-
isms could be subject to continued reassessment of the benefits and risks to 
public health and the environment, with ongoing participation and input by 
the public. Laws could create a presumption against genetic alterations to 
animals, plants, or other organisms when other reasonable alternatives ex-
ist.262 Approval could also require demonstrations of reliable oversight 
mechanisms to ensure the genetically-modified organisms are released and 
managed in the approved manner. 
Even maintaining the current focus on human and agriculture impacts, 
biotechnology governance is too limited to protect those interests in the new 
CRISPR era. Gene editing may permanently impact ecosystems in a manner 
that affects public health (for example, creating ecosystem changes that in-
crease the risk of other disease vectors) or alters flora or fauna in a manner 
that impacts local resource-dependent industries (for example, creating tree 
or animal species that out-compete indigenous varieties).263 There is a long 
history of seemingly benign ecosystem changes producing unforeseen im-
pacts. The increasing prevalence of ticks due to a lack of natural predators 
for their hosts, the introduction of kudzu to manage erosion, and the loss of 
topsoil and increased flooding due to deforestation are but a few notable 
examples.264 
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Implementation could vary depending on the organisms involved, the 
circumstances motivating the proposal to use genetic engineering, and the 
types of risks and uncertainties presented by the genetic engineering and 
non-genetic engineering alternatives. In some cases, the requirement to pur-
sue alternatives prior to deploying genetic engineering could allow excep-
tions if the gene editing option is found to be safe and superior to conven-
tional options. In other cases, where risks are high or core values are impli-
cated, the requirement could be more restrictive.265 The approach could also 
distinguish between laboratory experimentation and deployment of gene-
edited products, allowing research and testing to continue. 
Policymakers could look to federal lands statutes such as the National 
Park Organic Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, and the 
National Forest Management Act as models for incorporating additional 
values-based considerations into the biotechnology statutory framework.266 
For example, just as current federal land management decisions impact the 
interests of future generations, future generations also have an interest in 
how biotechnology impacts humans and ecosystems. Explicit consideration 
of these interests as a part of biotechnology oversight would provide im-
portant symbolic and substantive (in other words, judicially reviewable) 
criteria to guide decision making.267 Updates to the biotechnology govern-
ance framework could also incorporate substantive requirements to evaluate 
potential ecological impacts of gene editing applications that expand be-
yond the procedural requirements of NEPA.268 
Applying this inquiry in the context of genetically-modified mosqui-
toes, regulators would consider the societal benefit of releasing the modi-
fied organism and arguments regarding the availability of effective alterna-
tives. Genetic modifications to eradicate the Zika virus may be approved, 
but modifications to eradicate or control non-disease carrying insects may 
not. The inquiry could also distinguish between the types of diseases a mos-
quito species may carry, weigh those risks with the risks to other species in 
the ecosystem, and require ongoing public engagement and risk assessment. 
The process could also allow for expedited review in circumstances such as 
                                                                                                                           
Predators Indirectly Control Vector-Borne Disease: Linking Predator-Prey and Host-Pathogen 
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the Zika virus. The environmental assessment for the Key Haven field trial 
already includes many of these elements.269 The natural resource manage-
ment framework could shift the inquiry from procedural review of risks to 
substantive instructions to the regulators assessing the risks. Decisions 
could then be judicially reviewable, increasing societal oversight for de-
ployment of genetic sciences. 
The hornless cow may or may not receive regulatory approval under 
the proposed framework.270 If the justification for approving the modified 
dairy cow is increasing safety for cows and farmers, the inquiry would as-
sess what causes the risk. One obvious alternative to modifying the DNA of 
dairy cattle is to require greater space for the cattle. That outcome may raise 
costs, which would force agencies to weigh economic interests against the 
implications of gene editing. To the extent an agency is prioritizing one cri-
terion over another—for example, short-term economic gains over long-
term moral or ecological concerns regarding gene editing—the process 
should be explicit and transparent. The natural resource framework for gene 
editing could require it. 
This approach has multiple benefits for effective biotechnology gov-
ernance. It may avoid risks by limiting the number of discretionary releases 
of gene-edited products. It may reduce opposition to biotechnology where 
there is a more robust regulatory system that identifies benefits and risks 
and provides for stakeholder engagement. It may provide a market signal 
that guides biotechnology investment toward the most beneficial uses, as 
well as enhance support for gene editing when it is the only viable option. 
Consideration of value choices may also refine the use of precautionary 
principles when determining how to proceed with a biotechnology prod-
uct.271 
There are also potential downsides, such as impacts on investment, 
slower timelines for product development, and potentially allowing compa-
nies engaged in gene editing in countries with less oversight to achieve a 
competitive advantage over U.S. firms.272 Government officials incorporat-
ing the natural resource framework into biotechnology governance would 
need to consider these concerns. The multi-faceted approach to natural re-
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source management demonstrates that it is possible to tailor government 
oversight to specific resources, locations, and values. 
Creating a common set of criteria based on a combination of risk-
assessment and non-risk values would be an important step in breaking 
down the process-versus-product distinction.273 If the inquiry determines 
that a type of gene editing does not pass threshold questions of acceptabil-
ity, it may be unnecessary to proceed to risk analysis. This stage may identi-
fy applications subject to the highest level of restrictions—equivalent to 
wilderness areas or national monuments.274 In the genome context, these 
“protected spaces” may include categories of gene editing such as editing 
for aesthetic enhancements or deploying gene drives to eradicate non-
harmful insects, plants, or animals. 
B. Participatory Governance 
Many natural resource management regimes rely on varying degrees of 
public engagement to inform the decision-making process, going beyond 
formal notice-and-comment requirements.275 These strategies include en-
gaging individual actors affected by natural resource statutes, creating local 
advisory committees, and soliciting input when developing plans for parks 
or forests.276 These efforts contribute to more informed management strate-
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gies. They may also reduce controversies by allowing affected citizens to 
participate in the decision-making process.277 
Stakeholder engagement is a particular challenge in the biotechnology 
context.278 Reports and scholarly articles discussing developments in genetic 
engineering frequently call for more robust public engagement and education, 
but neglect to specify how to accomplish those goals.279 Although there are 
mechanisms for public participation in the biotechnology regulatory system, 
they often occur within the existing risk-based framework and do not ac-
commodate the range of competing interests discussed above.280 Creating a 
broader governance framework that expands beyond risk-based considera-
tions could allow decisionmakers to implement engagement strategies tai-
lored to the different types of gene editing applications. In the absence of an 
expanded framework, engagement is limited primarily to whether stakehold-
ers accept data regarding the safety of a genetically-engineered product.281 
More robust government-led engagement efforts could contribute by 
expanding opportunities for stakeholders to comment on appropriate uses of 
gene editing and available alternatives, including non-risk-based arguments 
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for restricting certain types of gene editing. Similar to the federal lands con-
text, these engagement strategies may differ depending on the resources, 
and the cultural and ecological implications.282 
Professor Kevin Esvelt and his colleagues offer a promising example 
of engaging local communities where gene-edited organisms may be re-
leased.283 Prior to conducting an experiment to control Lyme disease by 
releasing white-footed mice whose DNA was altered to make the organisms 
“immune to the bacteria that cause Lyme and other tick-borne diseases,” 
Esvelt focused on educating local communities about the risks and benefits, 
promised to make information gained through the experiment publicly-
available rather than treat it as proprietary, and committed to forgoing the 
experiment if local residents opposed the process.284 This effort empowers 
local residents to participate in decisions regarding the release of genetical-
ly-altered organisms and provides information so that each resident can de-
velop an informed opinion. 
Referendum-based measures could also help identify values-based 
considerations and provide mechanisms for stakeholder engagement. Public 
referendums, such as those conducted prior to the Key Haven trial of genet-
ically-modified mosquitoes, allow affected populations to express their 
opinions regarding the release of genetically-modified organisms or other 
uses of biotechnology techniques.285 Product labeling may facilitate another 
a type of referendum on biotechnology, allowing consumers to “vote with 
their checkbooks” by deciding whether to support genetic engineering 
through the purchase of engineered products.286 Product labeling has been a 
source of controversy since GMO products first started entering the market-
place.287 Pursuant to the Coordinated Framework’s focus on products rather 
than process, the FDA determined that the use of genetic engineering to 
produce a product is not a “material fact” subject to disclosure require-
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ments.288 Labeling of GMO products will soon become more common. In 
2016, Congress amended the Agricultural Marketing Act to require labeling 
of genetically-modified food products.289 It is not clear whether the new law 
will cover “foods that are the product of genetic deletions.”290 
Labeling allows consumers to choose whether to purchase genetically-
modified products. Opponents of mandatory labeling argue that it may sug-
gest that the GMO products are unsafe, again restricting the debate to con-
cerns about risk and safety and denying, or dismissing, that concerns may 
reflect a larger set of values regarding the appropriate uses of biotechnolo-
gy.291 Labeling currently exists for premium products and products where 
consumers may be particularly concerned about health risks.292 Mandatory 
labeling for biotechnology products could send an important market signal 
regarding public acceptance of genetic engineering, likely a reason that pro-
ducers of genetically-modified products often oppose labeling requirements.  
Elevating the role of referendum-based governance could also have the 
positive effect of creating incentives for more effective public education and 
engagement.293 Allowing affected populations to determine whether prod-
ucts or techniques are permitted accepts that approval or rejection may oc-
cur for a variety of reasons, some of which are fact-based and some of 
which are based on values, fears, or misinformation.294 Increasing reliance 
on referendums or labeling risks turning engagement efforts into public re-
lations battles among interest groups, potentially undermining, rather than 
facilitating, efforts to provide objective information. It could result in delay-
ing or preventing release, perhaps an acceptable outcome for emerging 
technologies with the potential for irreversible negative impacts. It could 
also identify the areas where the public is most willing to accept gene edit-
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ing. Both outcomes would inform governance measures as the science of 
gene editing evolves and potential uses expand. 
C. Conservation Measures 
Preservation, conservation, and concerns about irreversibility are re-
curring themes in natural resource management. Extracting resources, par-
ticularly non-renewable resources, foreclose the option to utilize the re-
sources at a later date when supplies may be limited, prices may increase, or 
shifts in public opinion would result in different choices.295 Extracting re-
newable resources may present similar issues, depending on the time re-
quired to replenish the resource or the potential for extraction to alter irre-
versibly the local ecosystem (for example, deforestation resulting in loss of 
top soil). 
Resource economists have developed numerous strategies to quantify 
the value of different resource uses and gauge public opinions regarding 
natural resource extraction.296 Consideration of use and non-use values, as 
well as “option value,” comparing impacts of near-term actions against the 
value of preserving choices in the future, are explicitly incorporated into 
resource decision making.297 In particular, option value could provide a use-
ful analytical framework for evaluating arguments for early uses of CRISPR 
versus uses that could lead to irreversible impacts on biodiversity, or do not 
justify release based on current circumstances because they do not offer 
sufficient societal benefits or present unacceptable risks.298 This approach 
would limit the near-term uses of CRISPR, but preserve options to utilize 
gene editing in the future if more information is available regarding benefits 
and risks or if societal perspectives on gene editing shift. 
Prohibiting the use of gene editing in some contexts would not neces-
sarily be permanent, but initial decisions to delay actions could preserve 
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options in the event gene editing proves riskier than initially thought, un-
necessary due to development of other options, or undesirable due to evolv-
ing social norms. Decisions regarding management, use, and preservation 
may change as societal values evolve. For example, the National Park Ser-
vice and the Bureau of Land Management have the discretion to change 
uses for areas that they respectively manage, provided the decisions satisfy 
judicial review pursuant to their respective authorizing statutes and the Ad-
ministration Procedure Act.299 Congress designates national wilderness are-
as and may reverse those decisions.300 Questions regarding the ability of the 
executive branch to reverse national monument designations have resur-
faced under the Trump Administration, but it remains indisputable that 
Congress could reverse a monument designation.301 
Although these designations may not be permanent, they create a pre-
sumption of conservation or preservation in certain circumstances, as well 
as a specified process for altering the management approaches.302 Congress 
could similarly reverse agency decisions in the biotechnology context and 
could also specify the circumstances under which agencies can (or should) 
alter regulatory restrictions. 
Gene editing governance could also establish the equivalent of protect-
ed spaces in the genetic engineering context—circumstances where gene 
editing is prohibited or limited on a temporary or permanent basis. Addi-
tional preservation measures may focus on preserving DNA, maintaining 
species, and ecosystems. For example, seed banks and storage facilities for 
the DNA of endangered species (gene banks) could contribute to preserva-
tion measures in an era of expanding uses to biotechnology to alter species 
and ecosystems. These strategies are already utilized to preserve DNA for a 
variety of reasons, including research, resilience of food supplies, and main-
taining genetic diversity.303 Preserving unaltered genetic material could po-
                                                                                                                           
 299 See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018) (requiring the balance of “recreation, range, timber, min-
erals, watershed, wildlife and fish resources” as well as “natural scenic, scientific and historical 
values”); 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2018) (authorizing the Secretary to regulate the National Park Sys-
tem to “conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” and to enable the preser-
vation of those for the “enjoyment of future generations”). 
 300 43 U.S.C. § 1782(b). 
 301 See Squillace, supra note 274 (noting that only Congress has the authority to get rid of 
national monuments).  
 302 For example, the National Forest Management Act specifies aspects of National Forest 
management plans, including requirements for public participation. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2018). 
 303 See Victoria Russo, Five Global Seed Banks That Are Protecting Biodiversity, WORLD-
WATCH INST. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2013), http://blogs.worldwatch.org/five-global-seed-banks-that-are-
protecting-biodiversity/ [https://perma.cc/MJN5-3KRA] (describing conservation and education 
efforts at major seed banks); Oliver A. Ryder et al., DNA Banks for Endangered Animal Species, 
 
2436 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2377 
tentially help mitigate unanticipated impacts of biotechnology products, 
serving as an emergency backstop.304 
CONCLUSION 
Advances in genetic engineering such as CRISPR give public and pri-
vate actors the ability to edit the DNA of living organisms, including human 
beings, with precision. Biotechnology governance in the United States is 
not equipped to address the new generation of gene editing techniques. As 
technological limits fall, policy choices will determine whether and how to 
deploy gene editing techniques. 
To the parties conducting gene editing experiments, the companies 
seeking to commercialize a genetically-engineered organism, or a regulator 
operating under the current legal regime, questions regarding the appropri-
ate uses of gene editing techniques may appear as isolated issues that turn 
on whether a proposed use presents specific, known risks. Considering the 
questions through the narrow lens of a single application of gene editing 
misses the full scope of the issues, however. These questions are about more 
than risk management. 
Moving beyond the product versus process distinction to more effec-
tively balance competing interests requires a different conceptualization of 
the genome, one that recognizes the range of conflicts inherent in the bio-
technology debate. Here, the nation’s natural resource policies provide im-
portant lessons for implementing a heterogenous approach to resource ex-
ploitation and conservation, accommodating conflicting views, and creating 
a corollary to protected areas by prohibiting or limiting certain biotechnolo-
gy applications. Decisionmakers should look to these laws as models for 
modernizing the system of biotechnology governance to consider a wider 
scope of interests, concerns, and values. 
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